



**Scuola Superiore
Sant'Anna**
di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento

the **ITPCM**

International Training Programme for Conflict Management



International Training Programme
for Conflict Management

newsletter

overview

Dear friends of the ITPCM,

I am very pleased to send to all of you our warmest Season's Greetings and our best wishes for a Happy New Year.

This issue of our ITPCM Newsletter is almost entirely devoted to Afghanistan and we are extremely thankful to all those who contributed with articles and interviews to present their

ideas and feelings about the present situation and the future challenges this country is facing.

Afghanistan is undoubtedly representing one of the major

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AFGHANISTAN



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points in the agenda of the International Community: the various activities carried out so far as from the moment of the dismantlement of the Taliban Government have not yet produced the desired results and, to a certain extent, have contributed to make the entire situation more complex. In the Articles published in our Newsletter it emerges that there are no clear cut solutions; this reinforces the need of an open minded approach to the whole issue related to the future of Afghanistan, taking into account as well the regional dimension of many of the problems.

In this framework we feel that every peace-loving human being and institution has to give his/her contribution to help changing this situation: the ITPCM is fully committed in this direction and is ready to contribute, through our research and training activities, to prepare human resources to adequately deal with these issues. We have organized several activities related to Afghanistan: from organizing a specific training Course in 2002 for the civilians wishing to serve in Afghanistan to the first training course in Kabul for Afghan civil servants, from the training of EU

election Monitors selected to observe the elections in Afghanistan to the carrying out of several researches on issue closely related to Afghanistan.

In the second part of the ITPCM Newsletter you will find additional info on new training courses which we are planning to deliver in 2010: you will notice that we expanding the topics of these courses and trying to make them more and more focused on the specific needs of those serving in international field operations.

As the next issue of our Newsletter is due to appear before Easter 2010, we would warmly invite all of you to send us short contributions about the activities they are carrying out or about specific issues they are dealing with: these contribution will make this Newsletter more appealing and vivid.

I wish to all of you and your Families all the best,

Andrea de GUTTRY
Director ITPCM

Contributions



**Dr Rosario Aitala is an Italian judge, an anti-mafia prosecutor, and a part-time professor of criminal law, with a lengthy experience in transnational organised crime, terrorism and in the civil reconstruction of post-crisis environments. He has been working for two years as Senior Adviser and Coordinator of Italian Rule of Law and Justice Programmes for the Italian Foreign Ministry. He has accepted to speak to the ITPCM newsletter on the condition that it would be clear he is acting entirely in his private capacity, as a legal scholar, and none of his comments may be referred to the institution he is working for.*

Lunar Justice, Moon over the Old Bailey, by STEVEC77

afghan domestic justice system

interview with Rosario Aitala*: legal adviser - rule of law in Kabul

a matter of time & training

How is the institutional building progressing, particularly in the establishment of the rule of law?

First of all allow me to clarify that my comments are aimed simply and exclusively at providing scientific analyses according to the tools and the theory of the legal science.

In other words I do not intend to assess, let alone dispute, any Afghan or international political decision, which necessarily fall outside the scope of our conversation.

Back to your question, the establishment of the rule of law is progressing very slowly and suffering some

crucial, but predictable blocks. Let me recall the sentence by Francis Bacon that Cesare Beccaria quoted on the frontespiece of his inimitable masterpiece *On Crimes and Punishments*. It was in 1764, and he wanted to make clear to his readers that his revolutionary ideas (on the abolishment of the death penalty

and torture, among others) were to be interpreted with caution, as follows: *In rebus quibuscumque difficilibus non expectandum, ut qui simul, et seriatim, et metat, sed praeparatione opus est, ut per gradus maturescant* - in intricate matters, one should not expect to sow and harvest at once; but must prepare and wait so that things mature by degrees.

In other words, I believe that certain demands from international actors of prompt results, even if justified by understandable pressures from their domestic public opinion, should take into account that Afghanistan lives a radically different reality from ours, in terms of time and space. We struggle to understand each other even when it comes to basic principles. Reasons for that are to be investigated in the country history, in decades of war, in its fragmented territorial and social texture, in its cultural mind-set, in the inadequate preparation of public officials and judges. All of these factors together have prevented the country from developing an "institutional" mind-set, which is preliminary to any political development.

More generally I think that there is quite a sharp divide between the Western and Afghan pace and timing for progress: international intervention, due to Western home affairs, public opinions and budgetary constraints is expected to be over long before than it would need to last in order to achieve and consolidate progress. That should be a long-term commitment.

Rebuilding the domestic justice system in Afghanistan, duty that according to the conference of Bonn was initially assigned to Italy, is a very intricate and treacherous task. What are the main threats and difficulties you have been facing so far?

Nowadays we have evolved towards a full Afghan ownership,

which benefits of international assistance. However, just by reading the *Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions*, signed in Bonn by the Afghan ethnic groups on 5 December 2001, you can realise the magnitude of the challenges and the extreme vagueness of some provisions; we are supposed to, I am quoting the agreement, "rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions".

Concepts and legal tools recalled by this sentence are vague and often in contrast between them: what is meant exactly by Islamic principles? And how and to what extent do they comply with the international standards? What about legality of the heterogeneous Afghan legal traditions when compared with the Western theory and practice of the rule of law?

There are many question marks, blocks and impasses that prevent Afghanistan and its society from being able, in the short term, to develop into a working democracy.

According to Islamic Law scholars, the compatibility of constitutionalism and *Rechtstaat* with Islam is very questionable and requires huge theoretical elaborations. Just to make an example: traditionally the elementary unit in the Afghan society is the family within the tribe, not individuals as such. Moreover, women and non-Muslims traditionally do not enjoy the status of legal entities. Raped women are still accused of adultery. To what extent then the new Afghan material constitution conform to international human rights standards and incorporate principles of non-discrimination,

as recalled by articles 6, 7 and 22 of the formal constitution? Similarly, what about personal status, family, and employment laws which rule or should rule the everyday life? Unfortunately the Supreme Court has never exercised the power theoretically (but also too vaguely) assigned by the constitution. While the country is drifting toward Presidentialism, the National Assembly and the *Loya Jirga* are too weak and not enough authoritative to counterbalance this trend.

The Afghan judicial system is far from working according to modern secular models, while massively incorporates elements of the Islamic judicial system and jurisprudence. The certainty of the law is a concept that does not apply here: there are not fixed and univocal nation-wide judicial traditions. A same crime can be judged and sentenced differently in two bordering quarters of the same city, not need to say in two different villages located in some remote province of the country. Causes with religious implications are often decided only on the basis of the madrasas' teaching.

The Afghan population is organised in tribes; that does not facilitate the introduction and ruling of a modern constitutional order nor state. We should also deeply rethink our traditional understanding of the relationship centre-periphery when it comes to Afghanistan. Here the periphery is the centre and the centre the periphery: Kabul and the central state are too far and too weak to deserve the attention of the most remote province's life, included its local powers. Within the society political maturity is far from being achieved: political parties do not exist here, democratic forms of associative participation and intrastate structures are really rare to find.

Corruption is another major threat to any kind of progress within

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The compatibility of constitutionalism and *Rechtstaat* with Islam is very questionable



Afghan Elections 2009 (Kandahar). An election worker at a polling centre in Kandahar. (© AK: GC)

the country. It is pervasive, and at times, the complicity with proper organised crime and trafficking plagues literally all institutions in the country. These phenomena divert enormous amounts of resources from public interest and social welfare, already affected by decades of conflict; nonetheless they also frustrate public confidence in the state and may eventually give birth to a proper “mafia state”, where political and administrative structures are so intertwined with criminal entities that one would not be able to distinguish institutions from the criminals they are duty bound to fight.

To come to a conclusion I would say that we cannot properly engage ourselves in the attempt to encourage a wished and effective rule of law if before we do not

deal with and hopefully solve the above mentioned issues. In due time. And with understanding and respect for cultural traditions and self-determination.

What is your view about the recent presidential elections?

I would say that as a general rehearsal for democracy the presidential elections were far from satisfactory. On the one hand, it is virtually undisputed that massive frauds have taken place, but it is irrelevant here, to discuss the precise extent of those frauds. On the other hand, I respectfully disagree with the decision of the Electoral Commission to proclaim Mr Kar-

As a consequence I seriously doubt that the Constitution was in the circumstances respected

zai president of the republic once Mr Adbullah withdrew from the run-off. The Afghan Constitution and the Electoral Law provide that “The President is elected by receiving more than 50% of the votes” and that “in the run-off, the candidate who gets the majority of the votes shall be elected as the President”. As a matter of fact this did not happen. Therefore I am wondering whether – speaking strictly from the legal standpoint - it was not the case to apply analogically the provision of art. 61 of the constitution “in case of death of one of the candidates during the first or second round, after the elections or prior to the announcement of the results of elections, new elections shall be held in accordance



Two Afghan kids run down the road that leads to the old Royal Palace of Kabul, by Alessandro Bianchi, ANSA, 21 January 2001.

with the provisions of law". Otherwise also a run-off with the third candidate from first round could have been contemplated.

As a consequence I seriously doubt that the Constitution was in the circumstances respected. And one cannot doubt that a second electoral round with only one candidate would have been meaningless and paradoxical: what for citizens would have been expected to vote? The Constitution provides that the elected president needs in the second round a simple majority, thus theoretically even one single vote would have been enough to elect the new president.

Of course there were noticeable reasons that advised the international community to endorse this decision, related both to vital security matters as well as states' own internal politics. But, as a matter of fact, the Constitution was violated. That said, we owe the highest respect and consideration to those

citizens who risked their own life to cast their vote.

What do you think then would be the better way to go?

I believe that we need to re-think deeply the rationale of our interventions. But switching from analyses to reality, I fully realise that the challenges are infinitely huge and, comparatively, we can only count on poor resources. Of vital importance is the promotion of a cultural maturation within the Afghan society, starting from the judicial power. Training and exposure to human rights respect is for sure a way to go. A time-demanding, yet indispensable process that might be able to generate an effective change in people's mentality. At the same time it is crucial promoting political parties and that sort

of entities intermediary between the citizen and the state that play a crucial role in mature democracies.

However, I set for myself my own small personal objectives. I believe that, if at the end of one given day, we will have managed, through our trainings, to raise in a judge's mind the mere suspicion that things may stand differently from what he personally believes or has been taught;

[...] of vital importance is the promotion of a cultural maturation within the Afghan society, starting from the judicial power

if we will have, by supporting Afghan Legal Aid lawyers, rescued from mistreatment or jail an innocent; if we will have protected the dignity of one human being; then it means that we are contributing to a better Afghanistan and a better world.



Afghanistan Lake, by Jan Colombo, Central Highlands of Afghanistan, Hazarajat, close to Bamyan. The Taliban planted landmines around the area.

by Silvia Valentini*

* Independent Researcher

FRAUDS & BAZAAR-ECONOMY IN POST-ELECTIONS AFGHANISTAN

"All we need to do is degrade the Taliban enough for the Afghan Army to be able to deal with them," James Dobbins, one of the high national security aides of President Obama, recently uttered. Mr Dobbins, who also worked for the Bush Admin-

istration to define an Afghan approach, announced the American Congress at the beginning of the year that the aim should be to *"ensure that fewer innocent Afghans are killed next year than this year."* *"In a counterinsurgency campaign,"*

he added, *"this is the difference between winning and losing."*

In the United States President Obama embarked on getting into perspective American ambitions on Afghanistan. He accurately

continued



i.

Birds of Kabul, by Deckwalker

averted the word *victory*, which had been often used by Mr. Bush. Following the advices of his defense secretary, Robert Gates, he abandoned the address of destroying Al-Qaeda and transforming Afghanistan into a Western-design democracy, which characterised the Bush era.

Western journalists visiting some polling stations over Kabul find ballot boxes already full, a few minutes after the polls have been opened

The “war of necessity” as President Obama named it during summer, is likely to be a route out of an eight-year-old-conflict. Still losing human lives (soldiers) in Afghanistan in 2011 could possibly mortgage a 2012 presidential campaign. However, even just overturning the Taliban capacity to re-establish bases in the country requires the restoration of a legitimate authority, able to handle the army and rebuild a corrupt police force, install competent ministers and gov-

ernors, the least committed to the insurgents, and effectively spend foreign aid.

Since the inauguration of the new Presidency, Mr. Obama and his administration have been unsuccessfully looking for an alternative to incumbent Afghanistan President. Over the past years Bush administra-

tion attempted to alert Mr. Karzai of the threats to his government coming from his own family’s alleged ties to corruption.

Electoral fraud, lack of security and low voter turnout characterize the 2009 presidential elections. Western journalists visiting some polling stations over Kabul find ballot boxes already full, a few minutes after the polls have been opened. In some cases no voters are seen inside or outside the stations. Similar witnesses and com-

plaints will reach the United Nations-backed Electoral Complaints Commission, the arbiter of the elections result.

In the hours following the polling day the ECC receive more than 2,000 complaints of intimidation and fraud and “quarantine” results from 600 stations with suspected irregularities. A few days later the ECC orders an audit and recount of stations where turnout was at or above 100% and where one candidate won more than 95% of votes. At the end of October the panel declare invalid 1.3 million votes for Mr. Karzai, about a quarter of the total cast.

In a country where politics works through a system of ethnic, factional and tribal networks in which power brokers organize support for a candidate in return for power, position or money, a mullah can urge his entire tribe to vote for one candidate.

Mr. Karzai was the favourite in the ethnic Pashtun belt that stretches across 12 provinces, a third of the



Olympic Swimming Pool, Kabul, by Mikael Hook

country. But as in those areas the insurgency is at its strongest, almost all the problem centres concentrate there and

it is too dangerous to send monitors and observers to oversee the vote.

Some supporters of all candidates have used the chances they had to effect the result of the poll, though with different degrees in access to money, means of violence and control over the local electoral, government and security apparatus.

Many of Mr. Karzai's supporters were government and security officials.

Mr. Karzai was the favourite in the ethnic Pashtun belt [...] but as in those areas the insurgency is at its strongest, almost all the problem centres concentrate there and it is too dangerous to send monitors and observers to oversee the vote.

A second round run-off between the two main rivals, after heavy US and ally pressure, is scheduled for November 7th.

At this critical stage in the process, a split comes at the top of the UN oversight body between its Norwegian director, Kai Eide, and its American deputy, Peter Galbraith. Mr. Galbraith addresses Secretary General Ban Ki-moon a scathing letter that will become public in a few days on

the pages of the New York Times. Secretary General will decide to recall Mr. Galbraith, and his chief

of cabinet, Under Secretary General Vijay Nambiar will say: *"There is scope for honest differences of opinion in terms of approaching a particular issue, but we expect the team to move in a unified fashion."*

On November 1, Mr. Abdullah Abdullah, Mr. Karzai's main rival, announces he would withdraw from the run-off because his demands for changing the head and officials appointed by Mr. Karzai in the Independent Electoral Commission, had not been met. *"A transparent election is not possible"* he adds in a press conference.

Diplomats are concerned that Mr. Abdullah would denounce Mr. Karzai possibly causing further violence. But eventually he does not take any step.

Dr. Abdullah, 48, an ophthalmologist, is backed by the largest oppo-

a cultural & historical note

Silvia Valentini

Afghanistan, central Asia's most populous country and one of the world's most profoundly divided societies, has a recent history of consecutive conflicts, pervasive poverty and failed reform processes. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, ethnic divisions have succeeded the cold war as

a source of violent conflicts. After the international military action toppled the Taliban regime in 2001, the country has faced a turbulent and complex political trajectory. During the same year an Interim Conference held in Bonn adopted a democratization model for Afghanistan.

We have to imagine a special dynamic of power and a lack of the sense of the state. Identity ties based on ethnic, tribal, clan, and regional cleavages have historically pulverized central authority. According to the scholar Olivier Roy, modern afghan history plays on the dialectic between tribal and rural world on one side, and Kabul, a modern metropolis, on the other. Political parties are still in embryo and political candidates are spokesman to their own group rather than to a political program. The social and religious structure though is marked by a fragmentation on the basis of lineages, clans and tribes. Such fragmentation pervades to a point the social canvas that even the sense of belonging to the Islamic religion faces difficulties as a social glue. The August 2009 presidential elections exposed a highly centralized political patronage system in which the head of state controls enormous powers, using to advantage personalities rather than policies. The new legislature is ignored or invalidated and its efficacy considerably diminished by the absence of a formal role for political parties and by the poor relationship between the ramifications of the state. The structures of the new state are fragile and the strong presidential system create tensions between the executive and the legislative branches.

The legacy of international community's involvement in Afghanistan aims, in the intentions, to the entrenchment of a democratic process.

In the field it resulted in the empowerment of warlords, commanders and criminals. The Afghans ask for safety, healthcare, schooling, law and order. But, particularly in the south and the south-east, they have not been given an alternative to the Taliban.

sition group, the National Front. He took part in the resistance to Soviet and the Taliban, acting in close relationship with the famous resistance commander Ahmed

Massoud, and served as Foreign Affairs Ministry under President Karzai until 2006. He started his campaign only one month before the polls. He declined

an offer to become Mr. Karzai running comrade, and he contests that the president carries out a policy of divide and rule that has polarized the country.

As a part of his electoral program he promised to revise foreign aids to focus them on grass-roots development, poverty and unemployment, and to constrain epidemic corruption.

He campaigns for the devolution of power from the strong presidency to a parliamentary system.

Privately, diplomats and journalists will tell you that Abdullah withdrew because he ran out financial and international support starting from the Iranian one.

As Mr. Abdullah has left the scene,

the international community will be looking to Mr. Karzai's goodwill to cooperate with his opponents across ethnic and factional divisions.

Western leaders are now waiting to his choice of a cabinet and selection of ministers who will be able to effectively contrast corruption and weak government.

An international study recently

Everything seems to be for sale: public offices, access to government services, even a person's freedom

An international study , conducted by Transparency International, classified Afghanistan as the as the second most corrupt country in the world



Kabul Bazaar, by Munir

classified Afghanistan as the second most corrupt country in the world.

The study was conducted by Transparency International, an organisation that tracks corruption worldwide. One of the founts for the results of the survey was the German Bertelsmann Foundation, who said *"The government is imbued by patronage and corruption [...] Corruption is endemic to all state functions (police, judiciary) and is seen as a usual form of business transaction; [...] Corruption is additionally linked with the opium business. Thus, bribery is invested on a massive scale to undermine efforts against the drug economy."*

An independent Afghan research foundation, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, said: *"Corruption networks [...] have spread in the administration [...] a 'bazaar-economy' has*

developed where every position, favour, and service can be bought and sold."

The New York Times reported: *"Everything seems to be for sale: public offices, access to government services, even a person's freedom."*

The BBC news: *"it listed petty bribery, position buying, nepotism, favouritism and clientelism, and the offering and asking for preferential treatment in areas including the law, land disputes and taxation."*

Aside from the geo-political regards of corruption and security, it is the immense task of the drug. Afghan opium kills 100,00 people every year, provide to 15 million addicts and funds global terrorism.

In an interview to Arab TV network Al-Arabiya, President Obama talked about his great in-

terest in improving relations with the Muslim world. But the image of America suffered a big setback because of the American-made F-16s and Apache helicopters piloted by Israelis dropping bombs on millions of Palestinians. This handed over a big propaganda boost to Al-Qaeda, likewise the consensus erosion following electoral failure in Afghanistan delivered them a wide strategic victory. The 2009, particularly the weeks before the poll date, saw the worst level of violence in the country since the invasion in 2001.

At the end of the Ramadan, a few weeks ago, Mullah Omar delivered a message to his troops: *"Victory is in sight, stay united."* And Osama bin Laden addressed to Europe: *"Americans are about to leave[..]So get out before."*



A Soldier from Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment (Airborne), watches cattle run for their lives while a CH-47 helicopter prepares to land on Landing Zone Shetland during Operation Saray Has, July 19 2009, near Forward Operating Base Naray, Afghanistan, by www.army.mil

by Benedict Borel*

**Ms. Bénédicte Borel is currently working within the NATO Public Diplomacy Division*

NATO's enduring commitment to AFGHANISTAN

The views expressed in the article are those of the author. They do not constitute the official policy of the organization represented.

Since August 2003 NATO is engaged in Afghanistan, through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Since October 2005, the NATO Public Diplomacy Divi-

sion has been running, on a yearly basis, NATO Afghan Student Forums. Currently, a group of twelve experts led by Former State Secretary Madeleine Albright is work-

ing on a new Strategic Concept for reshaping the Alliance role with respect to new threats and challenges in the XXI security environment. A first exchange of



Two Afghan National Army Soldiers talk with a local Afghan during Operation Saray Has July 19 2009, near Forward Operating Base Naray, Afghanistan, by www.army.mil

views on this subject at ministerial level has already occurred at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, which took place on 3-4 December at NATO HQ, in Brussels. It is the first time, in the history of the Alliance,

that discussions on a new Strategic Concept include the involvement of opinion-makers, think-tanks, and research communities in various NATO Countries. Against this background, what can we say, today, with regard to the evolving NATO Operation in Afghanistan, the Alliance's key priority? NATO-led ISAF is

not an operation under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which enshrines the collective defence clause for the Allied Countries. In any event, ISAF was launched against the historical background

of the first ever invocation of article 5, by the North Atlantic Council, on 12 September 2001. The Alliance is in Afghanistan at the request for assistance by the Afghan authorities and under a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, ex Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The legal framework of the mission is based on eleven UN Security Council Resolutions (1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776, 1833, 1868, and 1890).

In October 2002, NATO approved a request from Germany and the Netherlands for NATO support in helping them to prepare to take over the command of ISAF in early 2003. On 16 April 2003, the North Atlantic Council agreed to expand NATO's support to this

international force in Afghanistan. Few months later, on August 11th, NATO took over the command and control of ISAF. The decision turned the six-month national rotation of ISAF's leadership to its end. The Alliance became responsible for the mission, including through the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground. Hence, since 11 August 2003, ISAF is fully integrated in NATO's political-military framework. COMISAF (theatre Commander) reports to the Commander of the Joint Force Command in Brunssum, in The Netherlands (Operational Commander), who then reports to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), who exerts strategic command over all NATO-led operations. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) exerts political control over the mission.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510, issued in October 2003, authorised the expansion of ISAF outside of Kabul

continued



Kabul Mausoleum landscape, by Lens Linker

and its environs, hence paving the way to extend ISAF footprint on a country wide scale. The process of ISAF expansion was formally completed in October 2006. In November 2003, it was agreed to appoint a NATO Senior Civilian Representative, based in Kabul. The NATO SCR is an Ambassador mandated to carry forward the political-military objectives of the Alliance in Afghanistan, by representing the NATO leadership on the ground. In this capacity, he liaises with the Afghan Government, civil society, members of the international community (including the United Nations, the European Union, other international organizations, and donor countries), and representatives of neighbouring countries.

Today, ISAF operates on a truly country-wide scale and performs a wide array of tasks. Through the recently established NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), it trains the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA). It has provided security support to the Afghan National Security Forces for the first ever Afghan-led presidential and provincial council elections held in August 2009. ISAF also supports Afghan-led counter-nar-

Currently, ISAF strength is of roughly 83000 troops, operating under the command of General McChrystal. 43 nations participate in the mission

Currently, ISAF strength is of roughly 83.000 troops, operating under the command of General Stanley McChrystal. 43 nations participate in the mission. Contributions come from NATO members and partners, as well as from Australia, Jordan, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, 26 civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are supporting the extension of Afghan authority, and through that, the consolidation of security, governance, reconstruction, and development in the country.

The Alliance is committed to Afghanistan for the long-haul. It will remain in Afghanistan as long as necessary, in order to put Afghan authorities

otics operations. It provides support to the delivery of humanitarian assistance – in close coordination with the Afghan authorities, the UN, and NGOs - and facilitates the consolidation of governance, reconstruction, and development.

in the conditions to provide lasting security to their population without the need for open ended international assistance. Such a long-term commitment, reiterated at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting mentioned above, must be put in context. Considerable progress has been made in the past years. Almost 90% of the population receives basic health assistance. More than 6 million pupils are enrolled in schools. 4 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan. Moreover, Afghan leadership and Afghan-international coordination have registered welcoming signs of improvement. Two examples can be mentioned in this respect. The Afghan National Army leads over 60% of joint operations with ISAF. And considerable progress has been made within the framework of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). The JCMB is co-chaired by the Afghan Ministry of Finance and the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). It is mandated to steer and monitor the implementation of the Afghan National Development Strategy approved at the Paris Conference in

June 2008. In the past two years, the JCMB has undertaken impor-

[...] the mission remains achievable provided it is properly resourced, he (McChrystal) called for a surge of military troops, in order to re-seize the momentum



Camel caravan - aerial view – Afghanistan, Shot from a United States Army Blackhawk helicopter - somewhere over Afghanistan, by ViolinSoldier

tant decisions. It has approved a plan to increase the strength of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 134,000 by 2010; it has agreed on a new agriculture strategy; and it has endorsed an Afghan owned and Afghan led Civilian Technical Assistance Plan designed to strengthen the capacity of Afghan national and sub-national institutions. Finally, this year presidential and provincial council elections have been a historical achievement and have proven, despite a variety of constraints, that for the second time in modern Afghan history, a Government has taken office peacefully, thanks in great part to the courage and determination manifested by the Afghan people to exert their democratic right to choose their own leaders.

All that said, the gamut of challenges which still lies ahead is sig-

nificant. State institutions remain weak, power brokers continue to carry out malign actions, corruption is widespread, and various officials abuse power. Last but not least, the insurgents have continued to gain momentum. In his assessment, right after taking command, Gen. McChrystal did not shy away from this reality. In recognizing

that the situation is serious, but that the mission remains achievable, provided it is properly resourced, he called for a surge of military troops, in order to re-seize the momentum. Also, he called for a radical change of approach, underpinned by two principles: protect the population and enhance training of Afghan Na-

tional Security Forces in order to create the conditions for them to take more and more security responsibilities on board.

After one month of consultations with his experts, US President Barack Obama delivered remarks to the nation on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan¹. All stakeholders engaged in Afghanistan were waiting for this declaration, which has spurred many comments in NATO countries and in Afghanistan's neighbors. As the deliberations at the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting on 3-4 December prove, 2010 will see a reconfirmation of NATO long-term commitment to Afghanistan. Also, it will see

The USA will deploy 30,000 extra troops. More than 35 nations have announced that they will send more forces. They have offered around 7000, with more proposal to come

¹ Pakistan is considered as a Partner. Islamabad remains a very strategic and difficult actor in this equation. Where is Pakistan in the AfPak strategy? Does the International Community can really fight Taliban in Baluchistan?



Boarding Soldiers, Afghanistan, www.army.mil

an increase of boots on the ground. The United States will deploy 30,000 extra troops. More than 35 nations have announced that they will send more forces. They have offered around 7,000, with more proposals

to come. The forthcoming surge will pursue two objectives, simultaneously: regain the *momentum* from the insurgents in key areas of the country; and accelerate the building of capacities of Afghan National Security Forces, through mentoring and the concept of embedded partnering, which will entail having ISAF officers and personnel living, training, planning, and fighting together with their Afghan counterparts. Such a model will be replicated from the Ministerial down to the platoon/squad level.

Now, we need to further enhance our engagement with different public opinions to explain the rationale of NATO enduring commitment in Afghanistan. Indeed, the strategy in Afghanistan is sound and with more resources and a refocused military ap-

The last survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund shows that 77% of European countries disapprove sending more troops in Afghanistan

disapprove sending more troops in Afghanistan². Let's study the case of a NATO Ally: France. Why France specifically? France came back to the integrated military structure of NATO at the NATO Summit of Heads of State and of Government of Strasbourg-Kehl (3-4 April 2009). France launched a heavy restructuration of its Army in June 2008, whose details were spelled out in the White Book. French public opinion traditionally supports its Army, (and its engagements, for instance, in the Balkans and in Africa)

and is traditionally very proud of its Army. Moreover, the methodology adopted for the French Ar-

² See data, Transatlantic Trends 2009, p.15

proach, success can be achieved. That said, maintaining the support of public opinions remains a tall order. The last survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund shows that 77% of European countries

64% of French are against a military engagement - they were 44% in 2001, just after the 9/11 events

my's restructuration is applied by wise women and wise men who are working on the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance. So how does the French public opinion reacts to its engagement in Afghanistan? In France, after the ambush of Uzbink in August 2008, during which ten French Armed Forces died, the public opinion decreased considerably. This has been confirmed recently by a new survey published in August 2009, just before the first round of Afghan presidential elections³. According to that, 64% of French are against a military engagement – they were 44% in 2001, just after the 9/11 events. This survey points out that French's scepticism has increased in one year. In April 2008, 66% of

French supported the engagement in Afghanistan. What seems even more interesting is the link between elections which are considerate across the French public opinion as illegitimate.

The daily *Le Monde* in its edition

³ Survey conducted by IFOP, requested by the daily *Le Figaro*, published on 18th August 2009. 1 005 people took part into this survey.

of 18 November 2009 mentioned a non public survey conducted by the French Ministry of Defence showing that only 30% of French people are now supporting the engagement within the ISAF. Clearly, this decreasing of 6 points in less than four months could be attributed to how the credibility of the presidential electoral process has been perceived. Indeed, the coverage of French media focused on two points: corruption and legitimacy of President Karzai. In August 2009, 57% of Americans supported the engagement

the discussion at the French Senate gathered only 20 members of the Parliament. Mr. Graham Watson (UK) recognised that within the European Parliament Afghanistan has been clearly evocated after the 27th request

in Afghanistan⁴. This trend is also seen in other European States. In 2009, 38% of Europeans recognised that it is time to start withdrawing their troops from Afghanistan⁵. These questions came recently back into the political scene in France, with the publication of a report by the Defence Committee of the Senate. What solutions could be envisaged in Afghanistan in order to bring stability and security? Does a new strategy provide the solution? Does it help

promoting good governance and a State of Law? Not only France is studying these questions. But is there a real political interest to address these questions? The discussion at the French Senate gathered only 20 members of the Parliament. Mr. Graham Watson (UK) recognised that within the European Parliament Afghanistan has been clearly evocated after the 27th request!

4 Same reference.
5 Transatlantic trends 2009.

The courtyard of the mosque in Mazar-e-Sharif. © CIDA/ACDI : Pedram Pernia





A CH-47 Chinook helicopter flies over Kabul, Afghanistan, June 4, 2007. DoD photo by Cherie A. Thurlby, www.army.mil

by Fabrizio Coticchia*

**Fabrizio Coticchia, Research Fellow,
CDG Laboratory, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna*

THE MORE THE BETTER?

the new counterinsurgency strategy in afghanistan

The Western armed forces are facing a very complex strategic scenario in Afghanistan. The Taliban have significantly increased their military resistance, posing never-

ending obstacles in the way of reconstruction and stability. All the 41 ISAF members have tried to find effective and shared solutions to bring the conflict to a successful

conclusion. The new plan elaborated by the White House is just the last attempt.

After a review of three months, President Obama has finally an-

nounced a brand new strategy for the war in Afghanistan. He has decided to deploy 30.000 additional soldiers over the next six months, bringing the overall American force to 100.000 troops. The aim of the plan is to improve security conditions on the ground, preventing Al Qaeda from come back to Afghanistan. Obama hopes to obtain the commitment for an additional 5,000 to 8,000 troops from NATO reluctant allies. The overall size of the contingent will be closer to the maximum number of soldiers the Soviet Union deployed during its occupation.

Making clear that the withdrawal of the American forces will start in the middle of 2011, Obama has increased pressure on Karzai's government. A more efficient struggle against corruption and drug trafficking is considered the premise

of a successful strategy.

According to the American President, the new approach is based on three core elements: *"a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan"*. In this view a success in Afghanistan is linked to a closer cooperation with Pakistan. In order to defeat al Qaeda, Obama focuses on both sides of the border, promoting expanded operations (also with drone strikes) in the Pakistani territory.

President Obama aims at conquering "hearts and minds" of the Afghans. The additional troops

should focus on the safety of the population in biggest cities as Kabul, Khost or Kandahar where people still live under the constant threats posed by military violence, intimidation, corruption and poverty. The goal is to enhance the

control over territory, promoting stability and reconstruction. Thus the new strategy will invest money and resources in development assistance, trying to improve social conditions and political stability in a more efficient way. ISAF forces should reach the tricky equilibrium among reconstruction and

military operations, assistance and security, mobility and protection. The current situation in Af-

The overall size of the contingent will be closer to the maximum number of soldiers the Soviet Union deployed during its occupation

Afghan Border Police in Pakiya province, U.S. Soldiers with Apache Troop, 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment, and Afghan Border Police walk along a mountain trail during a patrol near Combat Outpost Herrera in the Pakiya province of Afghanistan Oct. 13, 2009. DoD photo by Army Staff Sgt. Andrew Smith



ghanistan well describes the inner problems of a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation. The Secretary of Defence Robert Gates has often stressed the tendency of the U.S. armed forces to focus on conventional warfare instead of referring to the lessons learnt of irregular warfare. In these months the overall attention has raised only on the evolution of the "western approach". However a success of the mission heavily depends on the reaction of the enemy. So far the Taliban have been able to adapt their strategy in a flexible way. Their initial aim was to reduce the technological gap with the western forces. After the very first defeats, they have decreased their vulnerability. Since the battles of Bishqab and Cobaki

(2001) and during the whole operation "Anaconda", the insurgents have taken advantage of their deep knowledge of the territory. The insurgents are not able to promote a general uprising of the population against ISAF forces but they are perfectly capable of a fierce military resistance to the western armies. The

increasing number of casualties among NATO troops, especially in the last year, is a hard proof of that capability.

Therefore the Obama's strategy plans to increase the efforts in training the Afghan army and police. In his words: *"We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future"*.

The insurgents are not able to promote a general uprising of the population against ISAF forces but they are perfectly capable of a fierce military resistance to the western armies

Facing a guerrilla with a COIN strategy is a very tough task. According to Sir Rupert Smith, modern conflicts are "wars amongst the people". The conflict in Afghanistan represents the latest step of a process that had its beginning in the Spanish guerrilla resistance to Napoleon and continued in Algeria and Vietnam. The revolutionary war, which occurs within the borders of the state, aims at conquest power with the use of armed force. While the idea of a "decisive battle" disappears, the combination of political, economic and social measures appears crucial.

In last three months the public debate has focussed almost exclusively on the concept of "surge". However, in a guerrilla

warfare scenario the number of "additional" troops is not the solely variable to consider. The ISAF Commander General McChrystal has strongly pushed for more "boots on the ground", aiming at replying the positive effect of the Petraeus' approach. According to the top military commander in Afghanistan without a significant increase of

troops the war in Afghanistan was likely to be lost. The advocates of a "surge" in central Asia has usually referred to the improved security conditions in Baghdad as a pattern of action. Nonetheless, looking carefully at the lessons learnt of the Iraqi COIN strategy tells a quite different story.

In fact, the decline of the violence in Iraq in last two years has been only partially related to the "surge", depending mainly on the agreements reached with the Sunni rebels. A strategic frame-

*Obama at West Point, N.Y.S,
1st December 2009,*

the new approach is based on

"A military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan"

"We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future"



LZ Arrival, Spent the day with Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan.

work deeply altered by sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing was the “precondition” that fostered that deal. In other words, the Sunni feared an incoming hegemony of Shia militia groups. Thus US support to the “awakening movements” represented a vital way out. Moreover the overall American strategy shifted from traditional “search and destroy operations” to a more elaborated counterinsurgency approach based primarily on the protection of the civilian population. The NATO would now apply the “Petraeus’ doctrine” to the Afghan

the Afghan armed forces have practically disappeared in last thirty years. Also for this reason, the American and the Afghan officials have started to assist local militias looking for an indigenous response to the Taliban

scenario. But the two countries are naturally diverse. Every political and geographical context contains peculiarities that can hinder or promote a specific COIN strategy. However, looking at the renewed strategy the influence of the war in the Middle East appears evident. Following the “Iraqi example” the Obama’s strategy focuses on training of national forces as well as on the empowerment of local militias. The idea is

to foster a process of decentralization of responsibilities, combining the army with self-defence structures among citizens. Nowadays the Afghan army and police forces are signed by dramatic lack of recruitment, desertions, corruption and infiltrations by Taliban. Above all, Afghanistan is still paying a high price to the extended absence of the State. While the army under Saddam was a strong and consolidated institution, the Afghan armed forces have practically disappeared in last thirty years. Also for this reason, the American and Afghan officials have started to assist local militias looking for an indigenous response to the Taliban. The goal of the new plan (which is called Community Defence

Obama’s strategy focuses on training of national forces as well as on the empowerment of local militias



Taliban, by Moshlihn, modified in Illustrator

Initiative) is to foster a widespread rebellion against the Taliban. That approach will face four main problems. First of all, the role of uncontrollable small military groups could increase, despite the international community efforts for a national disarmament. Secondly, the Afghan tribes seem not so strong to create something similar to the Sunni Awakening movement. Thirdly, the current emphasis on securing cities and trunk-roads leaves mainly to drones and Special Forces the control of rural areas where largely the population lives. In that sense it is evident

[...] the western forces will never be able to control all the territory with its troops on the ground. So that, the overall size of forces does not represent the main variable through which it is possible to accomplish an effective COIN strategy.

how the Afghan territory is completely different from Iraq. New equipments like satellites or UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) could help in the task but they cannot do the whole job alone. Furthermore "collateral damages" are more probable with the solely use of air forces. In summary, despite the recent surge, the western forces will never be able to control all the territory with its troops on the ground. So that, the overall size of forces does not represent the main vari-

able through which it is possible to accomplish an effective COIN strategy. In addition, the lessons learnt from the Iraqi context could provide only partial solutions for the war in Afghanistan. The ISAF members are still looking at a right equilibrium between security and reconstruction. But strategies and plans have been so far anchored to a western perspective, while only a bottom up approach could reveal the real needs of local population. Above all the international community should overcome the taboo of an agreement with the insurgents. Without a national reconciliation the Obama's goal to start the withdrawal in 2011 will remain just an illusion.

Above all the international community should overcome the taboo of an agreement with the insurgents



Brandenburg gate in Berlin, by Mart1n

by Benedicte Borel*

**BERLIN NOV 2009
NATO-AFGHAN STUDENT FORUM**

COMPARING PERCEPTIONS of the INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE

**Ms. Bénédicte Borel is currently working within the
NATO Public Diplomacy Division*

From 9 to 13 November 2009, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division conducted its fourth NATO Afghan Student Forum. This year Forum was held in Berlin, in the

margins of the commemoration of the Berlin Fall, and was organized in cooperation with the Hertie School of Government. The aim of the Forum is to gather students

from Afghanistan, NATO member countries as well as from Central Asia and to offer them a platform of discussion about the engagement of their respective countries,



Opium Flower, Afghanistan

the evolution of NATO/ISAF mission, the role of the international community in Afghanistan - in particular of the United Nations, the European Union, Non Governmental Organizations, and other international organization - and finally NATO's cooperation with these entities and its contribution to the comprehensive approach. This year, OSCE representatives were also involved in the discussions. For the first time, the Forum welcomed participants from Pakistan and Georgia. With the recent engagement of Georgian troops in Afghanistan, students could raise questions about NATO's future enlargement and political engagement. The Pakistani participation is in itself a reflection of the priority put by the Alliance on enhancing political dialogue and deepening cooperation with Pakistan.

For countries like Albania and Croatia, it appears that their engagement in Afghanistan does not raise any problem among the public opinion. The connection between a secure Afghanistan and

[...] even if Central Asian republics face direct effects of the Afghan crisis, their recommendations pointed out clearly neither a full fledged non engagement nor a real readiness by their countries to help the rest of the international community

a stable Balkan region was not the argument (contrary to other European students). These two countries believe in Euro-Atlantic solidarity and, according to them, this legitimates their cooperation with other NATO Allies. Students from Germany, France, and Portugal elaborated on the mission and role of their respective countries

in Afghanistan. The French student focused on the part played by the media (especially after the ambush of Uzbink and publications of photos showing dead bodies of French soldiers taken by Taliban), whereas her German counterpart raised the strong political discussion in Germany and the December vote at the German Parliament to maintain German troops in Afghanistan¹.

For Central Asian participants (all the five Republics were represented), the perception was very different. Indeed, even if Central Asian republics face direct effects of the Afghan crisis - including

¹ The German Parliament has extended the mandate of German participation in ISAF for another year.



Map of Central Asian Republics, www.bernardsbigtrip.com

cross border insurgency, Islamist activism within their own territory, drugs-trafficking, weapons smuggling, and so forth - their recommendations pointed out clearly neither a full fledged non engagement (with the exception of Turkmenistan, which remains adamant about her neutral stance) nor a real readiness by their countries to help the rest of the international community. They convened that cooperation between NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) or the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) towards Afghanistan is unforeseen and have doubts regarding a real added-

CSTO or SCO were considered more an economic fora than a platform for discussion on security. According to them, states belonging to these organisations would not be ready to become security providers in Afghanistan

cause of Russia - has been tackled with very interesting points. Students from Central Asia recognised that it is very difficult to engage these organisations in Afghanistan, notably because of

value that such a possible cooperation could bring. Russia is ready to help more in Afghanistan within the NATO Russia Council framework. The old and fashionable discussion – according to which

N A T O does not want to deal with these two regional organisations because

Afghanistan does not seem to be a priority in the political agenda of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan

the stance by certain participating States or observing states. . In addition to that, they mentioned the question of efficiency. According to them, the Alliance has more capabilities..

CSTO or SCO were considered more an economic fora than a platform for discussion on security. According to them, states belonging to these organisations would not be ready to become security providers in Afghanistan. Some remarks have been made on their respective countries links with Russia. Few of them raised their concerns about their respective ethnic counterparts in Afghanistan – Tajiks and Uzbeks. Where are Central Asian participations towards Afghanistan? Students described



areas of cooperation such as improving financial and commercial ties with Kabul, improving water supplies, electricity, medical assistance, possibly a higher level of involvement with PRTs. The discussion was broad and many views, perspectives, and ideas were exchanged. According to students, the conclusion was that if we want to engage our countries in this theatre, we have to do it through a multilateral effort and through the prism of Afghanistan. Some of Central Asian states recognized openly the need to act together, but some also said it would be difficult for political reasons. The Tajik journalist Umatali Ivanov was asking in *Asia Plus* the day after President Obama's declaration whether sending more troops in Afghanistan will really bring stability and whether there would be any positive effect in Tajikistan. Additional comments from Tajik experts underlined that it is already quite late to send more troops, though one can concede that sending more boots on the field could, at least, help minimizing the effectiveness of "active destructive forces"¹. All this denotes some interest. However, it also confirms what came to light during the discussions amongst Central Asian students. Afghanistan does not seem to be a priority in the political agenda of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Based on the past three editions of the NATO Afghan Students,

¹ See comments of Mr. Payrav Chorshanbiyev and Mr. Qosimshoh Begmuhammad in *Asia Plus* following the declaration of Mr. Davlat Nazriyev, Head of the Tajik Foreign Ministry's Information Department – Khovar's website.

this Forum was characterised by a real debate, around sensitive and difficult questions. Overall, the novelty of this year Forum was that among participants, from new NATO member countries and Central Asia partners, the same questions were asked to Afghan students: does Afghanistan want to become a democracy? Are Afghans ready to help the international community?

Such questions created a real debate, with many hesitations from the Afghan side. Indeed Afghan students did not really respond. Some of them, however, pointed out that the effort has to be shared by both sides – Internationals and Afghans. Others recognised that

Afghans participants recognised that it would be very difficult for their people to assist the international community [...]

it would be very difficult for their people to assist the international community. One example has been raised by one student; during the night, Taliban come into the villages and verify whether the population helped or not the international community. If local inhabitants are believed

to have helped international soldiers they are killed. It understandable that under such pressure, the population is afraid of being too closely associated with the international community.

About challenges and perspectives of cooperation between NATO and Russia, or NATO and the SCO/CSTO, points have been raised in many regards. The usual rhetoric according to which NATO refuses categorically to cooperate with these two regional organizations has virtually dropped out of the debate. Students asked themselves whether or not these organisations would be ready and able to cooperate with NATO on Afghanistan-related issues.

about the ITPCM

European Community Civil Protection Mechanism Courses

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism was established by the European Commission at the end of 2001. It aims to facilitate, on request, the civil protection response to all types of emergencies, including natural and man-made disasters and environmental accidents occurring inside and outside the Community. By pooling the civil protection capabilities of the participating states, the Community Mechanism can ensure even better protection primarily of people, but also of the natural and cultural environment as well as property.

The Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in partnership with the Italian Civil Protection Department and the Italian Firefighters, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department is

In order to enhance coordination of civil protection assistance interventions the Commission set up a training programme for intervention teams and for the experts responsible for assessment and/or coordination. The training programme aims at improving personal response competencies and at ensuring complementarity and compatibility between intervention teams coming from different participating states.

responsible for the design, planning, conduction and evaluation 8 Community Civil Protection Mechanism courses (7th cycle).

next courses in agenda (not open for applications)

Community Mechanism Induction Course

Location: Istituto Superiore Antincendi, Rome, Italy, Dates: 9 - 15 January 2010

High Level Coordination Course

Location: Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy, Dates: 7 - 12 February 2010

High Level Coordination Refresher Course

Location: Istituto Superiore Antincendi, Rome, Italy, Dates: 4 - 6 May 2010

Media and Security Strategy Course

Location: Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy, Dates: 28 Feb - 5 March 2010

Media and Security Strategy Course

Location: Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy, Dates: 18 - 23 April 2010

Contact Person:

Camila Ferrini
c.ferrini@sssup.it





International Training Programme
for Conflict Management

training course:

HEALTH SYSTEMS through CONFLICT & RECOVERY

12-23 April 2010,
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa

Learning Objectives

- The Course aims to introduce participants to:
- main features of conflict-ridden environments;
 - distortions of health services during protracted crises and recovery processes;
 - challenges faced by health services in countries experiencing or recovering from a conflict;
 - recovery processes;
 - corrections to long-standing distortions;
 - developing strategies towards more efficient and fair health systems

Deadline for application

11 February 2010,
12:00 noon (CET)

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VIA CARDINALE MAFFI, 27 -
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TEL:+39 050 882 685 FAX: +39
050 882 665
E-MAIL: itpcm@sssup.it

Applications & more info:

www.itpcm.sssup.it

(section training courses & events)



CORSO DI ALTA FORMAZIONE

COMUNICARE LA COOPERAZIONE E LA SOLIDARIETA' INTERNAZIONALE

IL CORSO:

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- ⑤ presenta buone pratiche e casi studio

date corso
21 - 24 gennaio 2010

32 ore
di formazione

scadenza domande
30 novembre 2009

400 euro
d'iscrizione

partecipanti
max 25

INFO & ISCRIZIONI:

www.itpcm.sssup.it
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International Training Programme
for Conflict Management

SUMMER SCHOOL

THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL of PEACE ^{KEEPING} BUILDING OPERATIONS

5-17 July 2010
PISA, ITALY
XVI EDITION

BACKGROUND

Over the last decades peacekeeping operations have grown rapidly in number and complexity. These developments have been reflected in the emergence of new doctrinal paradigms (e.g. the UN Capstone Doctrine) but have also been compounded by new ethical and political concerns (such as the concept of Responsibility to Protect). Operationally, 'traditional' peacekeeping has given way to complex, integrated operations which require a combination of political, military and humanitarian action. This evolution has resulted in an increased need for civilian personnel able to interact with an ever-growing number of actors and to perform the specific tasks they have been assigned.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES

The aim of the Summer School is to train participants for some of the tasks usually performed by the civilian component of peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding missions, with a specific focus on Human Rights and International Election Observation. A specific session is devoted to improve participants' capacity to design and pursue their own career path. The curriculum is divided into 4 modules:

KEY FACTS

Dates	5-17 July '10
Daily commitment	8 hours
Application deadline	19 April '10
Course fee	1250 €
ECTS Credits	5
No. of Participants	30 (+4)

INFO & APPLICATION FORMS:

www.itpcm.sssup.it

ANY ADDITIONAL INFO:

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RESEARCH

Aid and Violence: Development Policies and Conflict in Nepal

A Background Report by Francesca Bonino* and Antonio Donini

The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or CPN (M) launched its "People's War" in 1996.² At the time, the Maoists were no more than a small fringe party with hardly any weapons, few active members, and a support base limited to small pockets in remote hill areas. Yet, their ten-year armed insurgency transformed them into a powerful political force capable of standing alongside, and even overshadowing, Nepal's major, established parties. The rise of the Maoists in Nepal is impressive by any

standard. After a successful showing at the polls for the Constituent Assembly in April 2008, they came into power. To the astonishment of the world, this happened "at a time in history when Maoism appears to have been repudiated in the land of its birth, and when the entire spectrum of Marxist-Leninist doctrines stands ostensibly disgraced by the failure and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, and China's enthusiastic embrace of capitalist globalization, on the other."³ At the same time,

foreign aid has been a fixture of Nepal's development efforts since the 1950s. Currently, around seventy percent of the country's development expenditure is financed by external sources.

Clearly, the donor community has been the key partner in Nepal's development successes and failures. How did these two realities – the insurgency and foreign aid – interact?

[TO READ MORE CLICK HERE](#)

**Francesca Bonino is Associate Humanitarian Affairs Expert at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva. She has a background in political science and humanitarian studies and is currently completing a Ph.D. at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna of Pisa (Italy) on evaluation perspectives in performance and impact assessment in humanitarian organisations.*

RESEARCH

MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS
IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

On going research project

What is MultiPart

MultiPart is a research project that aims at investigating whether, how, and under what conditions multi-stakeholder partnerships can positively impact on human security and facilitate non-violence and long-term peace, while providing a productive framework for relations between local actors and external actors, including third party mediators and international organisations.

The project will base its empirical investigation on three case studies of core political interest to the EU today: Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Afghanistan.



the Scuola Sant'Anna (ITPCM-CDG) as
Project Coordinator

MORE INFO: www.multi-part.eu



HRs guiding principles

NEWLY LAUNCHED WEBSITE & OTHER DISSEMINATION ACTIVITIES

Earlier this year, the Human Rights Law Centre received an award from the University of Nottingham Knowledge Transfer and Innovation Strategy Group for the project Strategic Dissemination of the Guiding Principles for Human Rights Field Officers.

The grant has been used to further disseminate and promote the Guiding Principles. As a preliminary step to dissemination, a multi-lingual brochure was created in the language of the GPs and 800 further GPs were printed and strategically distributed to academic institutions worldwide and to all UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators.

Two major achievements have been the completion of annotations and explanatory texts to the GPs – which provide a valuable guide to the legal, practical and theoretical framework underpinning the GPs and the creation of a multi-lingual, dedicated website

www.hrfoguidingprinciples.org

best viewed in Internet Explorer.

www.hrfoguidingprinciples.org

additional copies of the Guiding Principles, please contact: agnes.flues@nottingham.ac.uk

The website was developed keeping in mind accessibility requirements in countries with slow internet connections. Structure and design are deliberately simple.

On 27 May the GPs were presented in New York during a launch event hosted by Ambassador Paul Kavanagh at the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations. Diplomats, senior UN officials as well as NGOs representatives attended the event. The panel consisted of Mr William G. O'Neill, Ms Jessica Neuwirth (Director of the OHCHR New York Office), Dr George Ulrich, who also contributed to the annotations, and myself.

The dedicated website has been live since August and was presented at the 10th Annual Conference of the Association of Human Rights Institutions (AHRI).

NEW
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WEB



the itpcm & cdg base in Pisa, archive photo

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