

overview

I am very pleased to send to all of you our warmest Season's Greetings and our best wishes for a Happy New Year. This issue of our ITPCM Newsletter is devoted to various topics of

great relevance for those interested in international relations/law/politics: from the articles on Kosovo elections and independence to the contribution on human rights promotion in Kenya.

Recent, and less recent, events in the international community, including the "Wiki-leaks affaire", clearly prove that the diplomatic relations in this century are facing new challenges which were un-


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thinkable in recent past. I am referring not only to the dilemmas related to the so called "intractable conflicts" or to those related to the "failed States" or "rough States", but also to this new trend which makes diplomatic confidential documents available to the public opinion worldwide. Whatever opinion each of us may have about this leaking of confidential info, it seems pretty clear that in the future we will have more and more often to deal with these situations which require some additional, creative and innovative thinking: on how to properly face these risks and on how to rethink the *modus operandi* of the diplomatic community.

In this framework we feel that every peace-loving human being and institution has to give his/her contribution to the development of new ideas and strategies on how to deal more professionally and effectively with all that. The ITPCM is fully committed in this endeavour and is ready to contribute, through its research and training activities, to prepare human resources to adequately deal with these issues. Let me just mention at this regard the recent Courses we organized in Cooperation with EASBRICOM in Nairobi (November 14-19,2010) and in cooperation with CCCPA in Cairo (November 21-25 2010) on Conflict prevention and management for experts and diplomats coming from all over Northern Africa countries.

As usual in the section 'about the ITPCM' of the Newsletter you will find additional info on new training courses which we are planned to be delivered in 2011: you will notice that we are expanding the number of our addressed topics, trying to make them more and more focused on the specific needs of those serving in international

field operations. Besides the traditional Courses (such as the PK and PB Sumer Course) we will organize a brand new Course on *Psychosocial Intervention in Emergency Displacement* which we will be run in cooperation with IOM next February and the Training Course *Health Systems through Conflict and Recovery*, which we will run in April 2011.

As the next issue of our Newsletter is due to appear before Easter 2011, we would warmly invite all of you to send us short contributions about the activities you are carrying out or about specific issues you are dealing with: your inputs will help us to make this Newsletter more appealing and vivid.

I wish to all of you and your Families our warmest Season's Greetings

Andrea de GUTTRY
Director ITPCM

Contributions

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by Francesca Fondi*

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THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO AND MONTENEGRO SO CLOSE SO DIFFERENT

In less than two years the Federal Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, created in 2002 with the Belgrade Agreement, has undergone two secessions: that of Montenegro in 2006 and that of Kosovo in 2008.

Almost three years have passed since the latter; nonetheless local and international media are still debating issues related to Kosovo's independence: the efficiency of the

established European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX)¹, the legitimacy of the declaration of independence²,

1 EULEX is the largest civilian mission launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), whose purpose is to provide technical assistance to Kosovo authorities mainly in the area of rule of law (including police, judiciary and customs issues). Source www.eulex-kosovo.eu.

2 The opinion of the International

possible negotiations with Serbia for the recognition of the state and the next parliamentary elections, planned for December 12th, are just the main examples.

But while Kosovo is still on the forefront of the political agenda, the

Court of Justice on the non infringement of the International Law with the unilateral declaration of independence was given on 22 July 2010.

same cannot be said for Montenegro's independence from Serbia, gained less than two years before.

Moreover, if Montenegro's referendum on the choice for independence generated in Strasbourg and Brussels hopes for a pro-unionist victory, well before Kosovo's unilateral declaration, the US had already "blessed" the future independence of the Balkan state with an official visit in Tirana paid by President George Bush in June 2007 (welcomed with the warmest Albanian hospitality). Despite apparent similarities, the two paths towards independence have led to much different outcomes: a smooth split in the case of Montenegro and a much contested separation in the other.

The main question is therefore why has Kosovo's declaration been seen from Serbia almost as an act of *hybris* towards its "mother country"?

The answer is not as easy and immediate as a first intuition could suggest. Tracing the peculiar traits of the two processes and identifying the causes of the two results, means going into the analysis of historical, political and social factors beyond them.

First of all, one of the strongest motivations to keep Kosovo within the Union was that Serbia considers it as the cradle of its civilization and the essence of its cultural and spiritual life. An aspect that brings forth ethnic and religious considerations: the cohabitation of Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Albanians in Kosovo has always created hostilities, while Montenegrins share the same creed with the Serbian population³.

Explanations of a different outcome lie also in the political and legal status of the two states when they were still part of the Federal Republic: while after the signature of the Belgrade Agreement in 2002 Montenegro could enjoy the status of autonomous republic within the Union, Kosovo was a mere province (Serbia had to keep control of its "heartland").

³ Religion appears also to be among the main reasons of the open support of Russia to Serbia against Kosovo's independence.

Furthermore, differently from its neighbour, Kosovo underwent a long period of transitional administrations by international missions since NATO's intervention against Serbia in 1999. This fact detracted the actual state building of the country through the division of state powers and the consequent conditions for the realization of an effective democratization process (namely through rule of law and legal accountability standards).

Among the political factors should be included the influence of two key figures associated respectively with Kosovo and Montenegro: Slobodan Milošević and Milo Đukanović. Briefly stated, if Milošević (before being arrested and sent to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague in 2001) had been favouring the spread of nationalistic feelings in Serbia over Kosovo (and died just two months before the Montenegrin referendum was held), Premier Đukanović, more of a "strategic thinker", had a less ambitious project for Montenegro, considering its friendly relations with Serbia and its more marginal importance within Serbian geopolitics.

Furthermore, and in line with a peculiar tendency to avoid violent patterns of political change, the issue of independence was being discussed within the Republic of Montenegro already since the Nineties. It is worth to be mentioned here an opinion poll conducted in 2001⁴ that forecasted a victory (with 55% of preferences) of the pro-independence faction in the case of a referendum. Similarities with the actual results of the "real" 2006 referendum (55,5%) strike. The apprehension of the international community for the possible reactions and consequences of these results⁵ were motivated mainly by fears of a

⁴ By the Centre for Political Studies of the Institute of Social Science.

⁵ For this reason the EU and the Council of Europe Venice Commission agreed to include the conditionality that the threshold for the majority in the referendum had to be 55% of the valid votes.

possible spread of the Montenegrin model to other areas: Kosovo, first of all, but also Republika Srpska and other separatist regions (Basques Countries, Cataluña, Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

Nevertheless, and in this lies the uniqueness of the case, Montenegro does not fit within the traditional pattern of ethnic and nationalistic paradigm: the wish to separate from Serbia is not to be explained by identity issues, but rather by more pragmatic and diversified concerns. Well aware of the importance to build its own state, fostering not only political stability but also economic growth and, above all, of the need to pursue the process of European Integration, Montenegro simply believed that all this could be better and more rapidly achieved without Serbia. Economic arguments have therefore represented the strongest argument for independence.

"Solanaland" has undergone two splits in less than two years, definitely smooth the first and clearly contrasted the second. No matter what was the position of the international community in the two cases, the two new born states have managed the operation fully aware that at the international level someone was against their move. Decisions have therefore been taken because of internal forces and for the interest of the state and not because of external pressures at the international level.

An hypothetical consideration on what would have been the directions of the separatist forces in the two countries if independence were not the final outcome, would probably conclude that the concerns that are felt today over Balkan stability would be present anyhow. Moreover, what we have seen until now is a much more stable geopolitical situation than the one that was foreseen until 2007 by international analysts. Already 72 countries (the last ones chronologically being Honduras, Kiribati and Tuvalu) have recognized the Kosovar state, which has been showing in the last two years a

certain readiness (notably through its constitution and the handling of the Serbian minority within the Albanian majority of its population⁶) to build up a democratic state. Furthermore and despite the international financial crisis, Montenegro is currently living a period of almost exceptional flourishing: growing foreign investments, improving relations with neighbouring countries, a positive momentum in the process of European Integration⁷.

⁶ As Daniel Serwer has stated, "Serbia is the problem": the issue of the Serbian minority within Kosovo's Albanian population is further stigmatized by the fact that Belgrade is making pressures on Kosovo Serbs to establish parallel political structures, not relying on Pristina's ones. From "Kosovo Isn't the Problem, Serbia Is", United States Institute of Peace website, available at <http://www.usip.org/publications/kosovo-isn%E2%80%99t-problem-serbia>

⁷ Montenegro signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU in

October 2007, which entered into force in May 2010; further agreements on Visa facilitation and readmission entered into force on 1 January 2008. Finally, submission of application for EU membership was undertaken on 15 December 2008. In its last opinion, dated 9 November 2010, the Commission considered to open the negotiations for accession of Montenegro and recommended that the Council should grant Montenegro the status of candidate country. Report available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/mn_opinion_2010_en.pdf

integration into the EU through expanding economies. If a feeling of regional identity and belonging, or at least a common root, is felt among the populations of the region, the sole collective path that accompanies possible shared decisions and political strategies appears today to be the European integration process.





by Ervjola Selenica*

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KOSOVO GENERAL ELECTIONS

THACI'S PDK CONFIRMED THE LEADING PARTY, THE ROLE OF SERBS VOTE AND THE SUCCESS OF VETEVENDOSJE

The first general elections since the unilateral declaration of independence of February 2008 were held in Kosovo on December 12, 2010, after an electoral campaign that lasted only 9 days.

The elections were the result of a political crisis within the government coalition, which was suddenly

announced by the prime minister Hashim Thaci, on November 2nd, 2010. They were organized among fears of high abstention and electoral fraud, given the absence of the UN monitoring mechanisms.

Hashim Thaci's PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo) won with 34.4% of valid votes, while the LDK

(Democratic League of Kosovo) was confirmed as the second party with 25.36% and the new entry *Vetevendosje!* (i.e., Self-Determination) came in third, reaching almost 12% of the voters.¹ The election day was

¹ <http://www.gazetaexpress.com/?cid=1,893,43379>, consulted on December

characterized by a long series of minor incidents and mutual allegations of fraud (e.g., double/multiple voting, and reported episodes of intimidation and violence). The final official turnout reached 47% of the electorate, a percentage higher than the one registered during the previous elections.²

The elections found Kosovo politically divided, in declining socio-economic conditions (e.g., unsolved youth unemployment). Corruption (and the perception of corruption) remains a serious problem, as highlighted by the latest *Gallup Balkan Monitor* (July 2010)³ and the EU Progress Report⁴ released in November as the day of the election was getting closer. Over the past decade, political participation has been rather minimal, as shown by the multiplication of signs illustrating a growing hiatus between political

parties and Kosovo society. Since Kosovo proclaimed its independence, the international presence in the country has become, if possible, more complex than it was in the wake of the war of 1998-1999. The monitoring and the supervision of the course of Kosovo's politics chiefly on the part of the European Union, the UN and the concert of great powers has become a hot point in everyday's debate. At the same time the negotiations with Serbia have been stumbling ahead and eventually postponed due to Kosovo's political crisis, while rumours over possible territorial swaps are persistent and sparks anger among newly emerging proponents of "greater Albania."

In the youngest European country, where 1.6 million have the right to vote, the elections might represent a turning point in view of the "renovation" of the political spectrum. Among the 28 political parties registered for the competition, two new political parties rooted in Kosovo's civil society made their *debut*, inducing some observers to see a clash between an "old establishment" made up of war veterans, and a "new challenge."

The political crisis was triggered by

the resignation of the president of Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu.

This choice came after the Constitutional Court ruled that a conflict of interest existed between Sejdiu's role as President and his role as the leader of LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo). Sejdiu had come to the head of this party following the death of the historical leader of Kosovar Albanians Ibrahim Rugova in 2006.

Sejdiu's LDK and Thaci's PDK, while rivalling for political hegemony, had formed a coalition government in 2007. Political frictions within the coalition were no novelty: the last major clash on the record took place in parliament during the summer over privatization law, tenders' regulations and the rationale behind the privatization of what is left from the big, public assets (post and telecommunication). At the prodding of key international players among which the US embassy, the PDK pushed for stepping up the entire process, while the LDK proved to be more sensitive to widespread criticism emerging from civil society's voices.

Moreover, tensions were exacerbated by ongoing judicial investigations in cases of corruptions.


European prosecutors from the

13th, 2010 consulted on December 13th, 2010.

2 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/13/kosovo-election-fraud-claims>, consulted on December 13th, 2010 consulted on December 13th, 2010

3 *Gallup Balkan Monitor 2010. "Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans"*

4 {COM(2010)660} Kosovo 2010 Progress Report, Brussels, 9 November 2010, SEC(2010)1329



EULEX mission had been indicting on corruption and related charges prominent public officers such as the Minister of Transport and Post Telecommunication Fatmir Limaj and the governor of Kosovo's Central Bank Hashim Rexhepi.

Sejdiu's resignation was the opportunity seized by Thaci to bury an uncomfortable coalition blaming his allies for a season of political instability. The leadership of the PDK considered this the right time for the strengthening and the prolongation of their government mandate. The choice was influenced by the expectation of an easy victory: the PDK would seek for a less cumbersome ally. Another political party such as the one set up by the tycoon Bexhet Pacolli (the New Alliance for Kosovo, AKR) would probably look ideal. This scenario was confirmed by the fact that the no-confidence vote *in parliament came upon the initiative* undertaken by Pacolli's himself.

Last but not least, the choice to hastily go to snap elections was motivated by the perception that hostile political movements emerging from civil society, were gaining political grounds and were ready to become significant political parties, also by ambiguously embracing the nationalistic discourse.

The existing parliament dates back to the election held in 2007, when Kosovo was still (*de facto* if not *de jure*) a UN protectorate. While that electoral campaign was deeply characterized as a competition over the domestic and international conditions that would soon lead to the accomplishment of independence, this time central themes were institutional corruption and economic performances. Both the men in the streets and international workers in Kosovo tended to see the *grosse coalition* between the LDK (which guided Kosovo during the nineties, the years of non-violent national resistance) and the PDK (which emerges out of the majority of former combatants in the former Kosovo Liberation Army) as associated with corruption and illicit activities. For a long period organized crime was taboo in Kosovo: everybody spoke about it, and confidential intelligence reports confirmed its significance, but "stabilization priorities" were

such that no major cases were opened under the UNMIK mandate over the region, while local judicial and law enforcement was too weak to take independent actions. Although prosecution cases are just beginning, the PDK which holds key positions of power seems to suffer most from this negative image.

In a country where the state remains the main job provider, the incumbent prime minister Hashim Thaci based his campaign on anti-corruption rhetoric, substantial salary increase by 50% in the public administration sector. Moreover, very much to the disbelief of EU officers, he announced that he will very soon achieve liberalization of the visa regime, thus bringing Kosovo on the same footing of the other countries in the region. His campaigning style started with a great degree of self-confidence, which had to leave way to some realistic doubts with regard to the reconfiguration of voting intentions in the country. Kosovo political arenas, which at least nominally is based on the vote of some 1,6 million citizens, gives signs of growing fragmentation. The enduring rivalry between Hashim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj (himself a former KLA commander, who set up the AAK party, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, and became prime minister in 2004) has become, if possible, even deeper. Haradinaj's campaign has been hampered by his troubles with the International Criminal Court in the Hague (where he is responding for war crimes). The "outbidding race" between the two rivals saw Haradinaj's lieutenant in Kosovo promising the electorate an increase of 70% of public salaries and an annual growth rate of 7%. At the same time, another example of ongoing fragmentation dynamics is given by the political choice of Agim Ceku, himself an ex-KLA commander, who briefly succeeded to Haradinaj to the seat of prime minister; following disagreements with this former leader, he left and became the boss of the small Social Democratic party. Finally, it is worth underlining that after stepping down from the role of president of the Republic of Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu was not able to keep his role as the leader of the LDK, which was won by his rival Isa Mustafa, while Ibrahim Rugova's son and his

followers left LDK party and migrated into the AAK.

Political representation is in Kosovo very much linked to the existence of powerful, nation-wide "support networks" that are animated by social clientelism and often reflect family links.

Outsiders, especially counting on opinion voting and not allied to the official "national discourse", had been traditionally marginalized. However, post-independence Kosovo has been changing rapidly. On the one hand the country's demography is changing due to urbanization and the predominance of youth. On the other hand, after catalyzing an intervention backed by the entire western world, the international presence in the country has been re-sized and altered. Aid agencies have been leaving the country, while the European Union has been trying to take the lead on "mentoring, monitoring and assisting" democratic elected authorities. In doing so, the EU has been trying to offer a "European perspective" for Kosovo while facing internal divisions over the status of the new country, and inheriting from UNMIK dismayed attitudes towards the international governance. The EU itself, while taking part in UNMIK as far as economic reconstruction was concerned did certainly not stand out positively. The expectations that Kosovo's nationalism attached to the attainment of independence were extremely high; the wake up in the middle of a global international crisis was a cold shower that generates further frustrations.

A challenge to the post-war, political party system is the political movement *Vetevendosje!*, spareheaded by Albin Kurti, an ex-student leader who spent two years in Serbian prisons coming back in Kosovo in 2001. *Vetevendosje!* has been gaining the support of the urban youth by both attacking the existing political establishment and the international presence that feeds it. In doing so it has been contesting the nature of Kosovo's independence as lacking popular sovereignty, and has been attacking UNMIK first and EULEX later as colonial powers. *Vetevendosje!* sought to spread beyond Pristina through voluntary, grass-root

activism. It is widely perceived as intransigent and alien to corruption mechanisms. When asked to respond for public disturbances Kurti refused to show up, calling into question the legitimacy of existing authorities. The decision to run for elections coincided with embracing a rhetoric and a program where left-wing, anti-globalization, civic activism is intertwined with heavy nationalist, and even pan-Albanian tones.

While chaotic privatizations are contested, displaying the nationalization of public assets in a plea for public control, the nation that *Vetevendosje!* underwrites does not differ from ethnic, romantic representations, including the call for the unification of Albanian territories, in the name of the right of self-determination. Kurti's program includes the suspension of any dialogue with Belgrade until Serbia recognizes Kosovo. Several observers, including some international officers, see in the rising start of *Vetevendosje!* the opportunity for an uncompromising opposition which would ultimately help checking the behaviour of ruling Kosovo elites and possibly helps opening of the political space.

Another new entry in Kosovo's political arena was the party named FeR party ("the new spirit"), which scored only 3%, thus failing to reach the 5% threshold that allows

political representation. FeR stems from a group of legally registered, prominent local NGOs and think tanks that devoted part of the efforts to analyzing public policies, and are considered to be EU-friendly. Born with the intention of bridging the gap between official politics and citizenship, FeR is mostly composed by young, liberal intellectuals and professionals educated in the US and the EU. To some extent, FeR reminds of ORA, a civil society-based political party that was led by Veton Surroj, an intellectual and journalist who failed to pass the threshold of 5% in the general elections of 2004, thereby gaining no representatives in parliament.

The political loyalty and participation of Kosovo Serbs is a major challenge for the newly independent state of Kosovo. All external observer agree on the fact that the new state has to be home to its minorities. Nonetheless, tensions are high, especially in the north, where the densely Serb-inhabited districts bordering with Serbia refuse to recognize Kosovo: a number of incidents were recorded in the months before the elections, and even the week before the ballots were opened, the killing of one Kosovar of Bosniak background, reportedly supportive of the PDK, stroke an ominous chord. Over the past few years elections were boycotted by Serbs living in north Kosovo, backed

in this by Belgrade, while the several thousands Serbs who left the country and theoretically have a right to vote were not put in the conditions to do so. At the same time, however, a number of small political parties sprang to represent the voice of the majority of isolated Serbian communities and enclaves on the rest of the country. It is worth underlining that according to the Constitution of Kosovo a quota of 10 seats in parliament is reserved for ethnic-nationalist minorities. This means that the vote of a relative small number of Serbs that have remained in Kosovo after the pogrom of 2004, might prove to be key to the formation of new government coalition.

As of this writing, it is too early to see how the next government coalition will be: the PDK party is likely to seek an alliance with Pacolli's AKR party (which scored a disappointing 7.4%) and with Serbian minor political parties. The new government will have to meet the big challenges over which the electoral campaign was fought, beginning with the socio-economic situation, institutionalized corruption, the EU integration process looking farther than ever, and the difficult negotiations with Serbia. Only time will say to what extent the new parliamentary opposition (reinvigorated by the success of *Vetevendosje!*) will meet the expectations that it raised during the electoral campaign.





by Samantha Bobbo*

**Former student MAHRCM - 2009*

IN KENYA NEWLY BORN **AFRICAN INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

Background

Charles Maina Kariuki witnessed with his own eyes the riots and interethnic clashes in Kenya after the elections on 27th December 2007. During those elections, President Mwai Kibaki, a kikuyu, declared victory and the opposing political party led by Raila Odinga, a luo, also claimed victory. Shortly thereafter the sponta-

neous violence against the results and the swearing in of President Kibaki erupted especially among Luo Nyanza, Western and Coast provinces. Within a matter of hours, Rift Valley had erupted into violence never witnessed before. While the Luo were demonstrating against their candidate's loss (Raila Odinga), the violence in the Rift

Valley, just like in 1992 and 1997, was tribally motivated and based on land titles matters that the local Kalenjin community had complained against the Kikuyus since independence. Charles' parents were living in the Rift Valley since 1974 so, when the riots began his first thought went to them. Upon listening to the news aired by

the radio, he immediately called them to know that they were on the run. Aware that his parents' house had been put down and that everything they owned, including animals, had been robbed, Charles felt compelled to go there as they were left with no means of survival.

Unfortunately, upon his arrival Charles found that his father had in the meanwhile died of an heart attack . The remaining of his family had found recovery in a provisory camp arranged within the premises of the local police station. Thereafter part of Charles' family moved alongside him to Nairobi where they resided for three months until a national agreement between the two factions occurred. Eventually an Italian NGO built permanent houses for some of those rendered IDPs in that occasion, including Charles' mother.

Since the advent of multi- party democracy in Kenya in 1991, electoral violence has become the order of the day. Every five years during general elections innocent lives are sacrificed as if it were a ritual. The 2007 riots were one of the worst episodes of electoral violence that almost led Kenya to civil strife had the international community (especially the negotiations conducted by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan) not intervened. The result was a power sharing agreement that left Mwai Kibaki as President but established a Prime Minister position

for opposition leader Raila Odinga, in addition to doubling the number of cabinet-level positions. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act came up with four agenda items:

- Immediate end of political violence
- Humanitarian response
- Youth employment
- Changes with the institutional framework: a new constitution, electoral laws, truth justice and reconciliation, and national cohesion and integration.

Since then corresponding commissions have been established and the process led to the adoption of a new constitution with 60% popular consent in August 4th this year. Meanwhile IDPs resettlement and relocation has been hectic, succeeding in some areas and failing in others. Many camps still dot various parts of Kenya three years down the line. Furthermore, while the government established a Ministry for youth and a program for youth empowerment known as Kazi kwa Vijana, a lot still needs to be done for this population segment still very prone to political manipulation.

The political crisis after the post election violence disrupted every sector of the economy, and while the analysts estimate losses in order of billion of Dollars, its true cost may never be fully accounted for. The violence led to 1133 deaths, 350.000 persons

rendered IDPs and gross violations of human rights including rape, blatant property destruction, as we as episodes like the infamous setting ablaze of a church in Eldoret where 35 IDPs, including children, lost their lives. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has open an investigation against those that perpetrated the massacre, as Kenya is one of those States that ratified the Rome Statute. This means that Kenya is bound to cooperate with the ICC, including by executing the warrants of arrest mandated by it. However, one has to note that when Sudan 's president Omar al-Bashir (charged with war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity) visited the country to take part in the celebrations for the upcoming constitution in August this year, Kenya refused to arrest him. This is all the more worrisome as Kenya's unwillingness to arrest President Omar al-Bashir may also signal an unwillingness by its national authorities to cooperate with the ICC new investigations and future prosecutions of the crimes committed on the aftermath of the 2007 elections . As a matter of fact, Kenya faces still nowadays problems of violations of human rights, poverty and displaced people, due to several causes ranging from ethnic animosity, to competition for access to scarce vital resources and ensuing land disputes, from corruption to proliferation of firearms, and so on. The situation in Kenya, once



one of the most dynamic countries in the region, is emblematic example for a broader picture of Eastern Africa today.

The institute

Be as it is, the 2007 post elections violence episode had a further consequence in that it influenced Charles's vision of what was possible to do in Kenya in order to foster peace and human rights. He realized that more activism was needed at grassroots level and began to cultivate the idea to create an NGO for which, though, he felt he lacked some of the needed conceptual instruments and relevant practical skills. Then one day, the institution where he was working at the time, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, circulated the info about the Master on Human Rights and Conflict Management offered by the Scuola Sant'Anna in Pisa and Charles felt that the programme described could well complement his existing expertise and bring him one step closer to his goal. His application was successful and by attending the MA he gained further knowledge about theory and practice of human

rights, as well as some skills and methodologies that proved very useful once he returned home.

Back in Nairobi, Charles, armed with the MA, wide experience and he being an IDP, approached like-minded colleagues with the idea of forming an initiative for peace and human rights. They were all very supportive and agreed to be part of the initiative. And that's how, in January 2010 after overcoming red tape and a certain governmental ostracism, the African Institute for Peace and Human Rights was born. Founded by three Kenyans, one Congolese and one Italian citizen, the organization enjoys a wealth of both experience and professional capacity. Two of the founders have MA in human rights and conflict management from Italy, one is pursuing a PhD in human rights, another one is an advocate of the high court of Kenya cum journalist, while the fifth one is trained in community development and has been an administrator with an international NGO for almost ten years. The African Institute for Peace and Human Rights has the objective to sensitize people and communities about their rights and the importance

of activism in promoting such rights. This is why one of the first activities that the NGO undertook was the planning of awareness campaigns for the referendum of August 4th as a pivotal step in order to obtain a constitution in Kenya. Furthermore the NGO aims at providing disciplinary and interdisciplinary training and capacity building, undertaking cutting-edge research and policy analysis in the field of human rights and peace; and promoting and facilitate multi-stakeholder debates and dialogue on these issues. The Institute has also been monitoring compliance of Government's actions, laws and policies with constitutional order and regional and international agreements in the area of human rights and peace, and aims at providing policy and legislative advice in this field to Government, civil society organizations, development partners and other stakeholders.

As of today, the African Institute for Peace and Human Rights is among the few in Kenya offering a comprehensive, sustainable peace and human rights agenda for Kenya and beyond.



HOTEL 'OUATTARA'

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTION

THROUGH THE EYES OF AN

ELECTORAL OBSERVER

by Maria João Andrade*

**Former Participant PK 2008 Summer School
International Electoral Observer*

4 March 2007 – The Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA).

On this date, the Burkinabe President Compaore mediated an accord between President Laurent Gbagbo and the Secretary General of the "Forces Nouvelles", Guillaume Soro. The agreement established the creation of a new government and prescribed the retreat of the UN Blue Helmets and French soldiers deployed in the Ivory Coast since the end of 2002. The OPA was the first endogenous agreement amongst Ivoirians, and it was clear about the need to restore the authority of the state in the national territory, and guarantee the free movement of people and goods. The two parties also

agreed upon creating the necessary conditions to hold free, open, transparent and democratic elections, and allow the proper functioning of the political, administrative and military institutions in the Ivory Coast.

Since the OPA was signed, the National Program of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion (DDR) paved the ground for the holding of presidential elections in the Ivory Coast. However, issues of national identity persisted and led to elections being postponed several times. The process was hampered further in February 2010 when President Gbagbo dissolved the

government and the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) due to claims of voter registration fraud. Following weeks of violence, a new government was formed and President Gbagbo appointed a new head of the CEI. Finally, on July 2010 the Prime Minister Soro announced that the first round of elections would take place on Sunday 31 October 2010.

For the first round of the presidential elections, I was an observer based in the "Vallée du Bandama" region. The capital of the region is Bouake, the second largest city in the country, and the fief of "Forces Nouvelles". The population of Bouake is essentially comprised of the Baoule ethnic

group, and the electoral district counts 257.267 electors. On the 31st of October at 6am the city was calm, and it was striking to see that most of the population came to the polling stations to vote. Even people who lived in small towns showed up. In the numerous polling stations that I visited, happiness was present among the population during the whole day.

As an observer, I was honored to be given the opportunity to witness such an historic event. The division of the country was obvious and we could find check points and "Forces Nouvelles" all over the place. On Tuesday 2 November the results were revealed: Ouattara (RDR) won with 50,65%, Bedie (PDCI/RDA) had 39,33% and Gbagbo (LMP) had 8,35%. Those were the results of the electoral district of Bouake. In Abidjan the results were different: Gbagbo reached 38,04%, Ouattara had 32,07% and Bedie had 25,24%. For the entire country, Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara were the two final candidates after the first round of voting. Participation was a record high of 83%. The second round of the presidential elections was to occur on the 28th of November 2010.

When I returned to Ivory Coast for the second round, I bought the newspaper "Jeune Afrique" and was really surprised to read that Ouattara said that he found his opponent very nice. It seemed that the two candidates spoke several times on the phone, and that they even joked. Therefore, everything was expected to be calm for the second round. On Thursday 25th of November at 9pm the two candidates held a debate at the RTI, the public national television. It was a historic moment where both parties promised to respect their commitment and to accept the results.

The following day, I had the opportunity to attend the press conference at the Golf Hotel conducted by the Prime Minister Soro. He was very optimistic about the second round because the first round went pretty smoothly. The campaign for the second round started with some incidents, but the debate between the two candidates was very reassuring according to everyone. However, tensions began to rise after President Laurent Gbagbo decided to implement a curfew on Election Day.

During the second round of elections,

I was an observer in Abidjan in the Yopougon district. After I read the cartoons "Aya Yopougon" of Marguerite Abouet, which I love, I thought Abidjan would be a nice place to be an observer. But when the night came, and we were only two observers in the CED (District Electoral Commission) office with 4000 election workers representing 1200 polling stations, we understood that our observation mission would have been extremely difficult.

The days following the election were intense with everyone waiting for the results. The Ivorian Constitution dictates that the CEI (Independent Electoral Commission) has 3 days to proclaim the results. Each day that passed seemed to be a full week, and the tension built to a "crescendo".

Finally, on the evening of Tuesday 30th of November (the second day after the elections), the CEI was ready to announce the results when something unpredictable happened. When the spokesman of CEI, Bamba Yacouba, was about to read the provisional results, one of President Gbagbo's partisans violently grabbed the precious statement and ripped



it up in front of dazed journalists and TV reporters. Nevertheless, the CEI still had one more day left to announce the results, the deadline being Wednesday at midnight. However, Wednesday came and went, and nothing happened.

For safety reasons, I decided to leave the Golf Hotel, which had become Alassane Ouattara's headquarters. In fact, on Wednesday morning I had the impression that all ingredients were in place to make this hotel a fortress. I was reminded of the movie "Hotel Rwanda". I headed up to a small town (Grand Bassam) near Abidjan to take refuge in a friend's house until things calmed down. I spent five days at my Italian friend's house. I had not seen him for 17 years, since we were both students at the University of Political Science "Cesare Alfieri" in Florence. To my friend Alessandro Rabbiosi an enormous "Grazie mille".

The results were announced on Thursday. I heard on the French TV Chanel France 24 that Ivory Coast had a new president: Alassane Ouattara with more than 54% of votes. Gbagbo's reaction to this news was communicated shortly thereafter when he announced on RTI that CEI

had not respected the Constitutional 3 day period. As President, Gbagbo would instead honor the decision of the Constitutional Council. A few hours later Paul Yao N'dre, President of the Constitutional Council, appeared on TV announcing the final results: Gbagbo was the new President of Ivory Coast with more than 51% of votes. The Constitutional Council had rejected the vote in seven electoral districts stating that the process was neither democratic nor transparent.

For the first time in its history, Ivory Coast had two presidents – one announced by CEI "Alassane Ouattara" and another one confirmed by the Constitutional Council "Laurent Gbagbo". Following the announcement of the results, official statements from the European Union, United States, United Nations, African Union, and ECOWAS all recognized the new President of Ivory Coast "Alassane Ouattara". With an iron fist towards the International Community, Gbagbo closed all the borders on Friday 3rd of December. I was part of the International Community that was stuck in Ivory Coast and probably one of the last observers to leave the country.

Those days were breathtaking. We would wake up and start checking the news on the Internet, speaking with family and friends, and food became an element so important to our wellbeing. In this situation, going outside was not an option. On Monday, Gbagbo finally decided to open the borders. I immediately called Air France to see if they had a seat available in their first flight.

On Tuesday morning, I left Alessandro's house and made my way to the airport. It was a very strange experience as everyone was in panic and anxious to leave the country. The plane was full of journalists, UN people, diplomats and essentially foreigners. I can tell that I never enjoyed travel as much as that day.

From what I can read, while the crisis has not been resolved, I assume that the key of the solution for the Ivory Coast might come from its population, as the meaning of democracy: "rule of the people". Unfortunately, at this point, it appears that a period of violence may be inevitable on the path to democracy.



about the ITPCM

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FROM JANUARY 2012 NEWLY LAUNCHED

MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL POLICY & PRACTICE

The Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna and Creative Associates International are pleased to announce the Master of Arts in International Electoral Policy and Practice, a one-year, post-graduate programme that is intended to begin in January 2012. The programme provides advanced learning in electoral system design, administration, and evaluation. The syllabus of the Master Programme includes 440 hours of classroom lectures and exercises, 160 hours of internships, and a final written thesis. The Programme is supported by a global network of universities as sources of students and providing research, guest lecturers and special seminars. The Programme also involves Election Management Bodies (EMBs) as hosts for the internships and employers of the graduates.

There are three strategic objectives that this Programme seeks to fulfill. First, during the recent expansion in electoral governance, election admin-

istrators were often recruited in an unsystematic manner and required on-the-job training. Such circumstances necessitated international electoral assistance to bridge the skills and experience gaps. Based on those gaps, this Programme focuses on the development of the "electoral professional," that is, the chair or top executive position on creating a common set of norms, behavioural standards, and qualifications to assume the professional responsibility of electoral administration.

Second, there is a significant disparity between the number of men and women occupying executive positions at EMBs. Although female representation can be found on most electoral commissions, the chair or top executive positions are dominated by men. This Programme will place a recruitment emphasis on female candidates, designating that over 50% of the total class seats will be reserved for female students.

Third, the current generation of administrators who pioneered a 30 year expansion period are approaching retirement. These changes will produce a generational demand for qualified electoral administrators. Without a systematic approach to the education and recruitment of electoral professionals, these positions risk being filled in the same ad hoc ways as before. This Programme provides a systematic approach to developing the human capital to meet this labour deficit challenge.

There are five key organizational stakeholders in the Programme: (1) Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna; (2) Creative Associates International; (3) international electoral partners; (4) EMB partners; and (5) university partners.

For more details please contact:
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CREATIVE ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL



Scuola Superiore
Sant'Anna
di Studi Universitari e di Perfezionamento

EASBRICOM

TRAINING OF TRAINERS

COURSE

Nairobi, 14 - 19 November 2010



The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) foresees the creation of an African Standby Force and allocates crisis management responsibilities to five regions in the continent: North, Central, West, East and South. Each region is tasked to create a crisis management capacity that has a military a police and a civilian component.

In this framework, and in order to reinforce its civilian component, EASBRICOM developed with Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna the first Training of Trainers (ToT) with the objective of creating a pool of experts able to transfer their competence in the East region.

The ToT lasted 5 days and ½ and was held from 14 to 19 November 2010.

The objective of the ToT was to enhance participants capacity to effectively delivery training sessions. The curriculum was structured in three training modules:

- Introduction to adult learning
- Design and delivery training methodologies
- Class management

The training methodology has been highly interactive, with participants constantly called to directly practice the different training techniques. In

particular, each participant has been requested to design and deliver a lecture within a peer review and coached session. To practice the role play and to write a case study, the class was divided into 3 working groups. The work produced was discussed in plenary through a peer review. Each group received specific feedback on their performance by facilitators and other participants.

On a voluntary base, participants had to lead icebreaking and warm-up sessions every day.

On the 5th day, participants had to design and implement a complex training session inclusive of all the methodologies approached in the previous days. The topics for this exercise were selected directly by working groups and were: 1) Child abuse; 2) Code of conduct in Peace Support Operations; 3) Duties of traffic police officers. The performance of each group was assessed through a plenary feed back session.

On the same day, from 16.00 to 18.00, Mr Getahun Seifu, Legal Advisor of the EASF Coordination Mechanism briefed participants on: The African Peace and Security Architecture and the East African Stabilization Force.

The morning of day 6 was devoted to: providing final comments and

suggestions on the complex training sessions carried out by participants; addressing gaps and doubts on the topics approach during the entire course; running an oral evaluation of the ToT.

Participants were 20 experts (12 men and 8 women) with different academic and professional backgrounds - nominated by EASBRICOM member States - coming from the following East African countries: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda.

The ToT started with an opening ceremony and welcoming remarks done by the Director of EASBRICOM and by Professor Andrea de Guttry of Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna.

On Friday 19th November, during the closing ceremony closing remarks were done by UNDP Representative, AU Representative, the Head of the Civilian Component, the Director of EASBRICOM and H.E. the Ambassadors of Japan.



BERLIN, NOVEMBER 8 - 9, 2010

BRAINSTORMING MEETING

TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FRAMEWORK METHODOLOGY FOR TRAINING DELIVERY IN CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna (SSSA) and the Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF) co-organized a brainstorming meeting on the "Development of a framework methodology for training delivery in Civilian Crisis Management" in Berlin on 8 and 9 November 2010.

The meeting built upon the recommendations and reflections stemming from the EGT London workshop of September 2009 on "Exploring Compatibility of Training Standards in the Field of Civilian Crisis Management" and was informed by the discussions and deliberations of the thematic session on the standardisation of curricula for the training of civilian personnel for PSOs held within the framework of the Addis Ababa "Training and Rostering Community Roundtable on the UN Civilian Capacity Review" of 29 June 2010.

The event effectively represented an avenue to discuss and agree upon harmonised approaches in setting standards for the delivery methodology of courses, assess and evaluate the level of learning, and provide guidelines to follow and

principles which would inspire the work of both training providers and trainers. Such an issue constitutes a key element of any discussion on strategies, measures and actions to strengthen the civilian capacity of crisis management missions but has so far received only a marginal attention.

The workshop was divided into three parts. A first session devoted to presentations organized in the following way: a brief presentation of the keynote speaker and a short comment by a discussant. During the second session, the brainstorming continued in working groups. A final plenary session was devoted to presentations of the discussions of the working groups and to the formulation of recommendations for each issue area debated.

There were around 30 participants, representing the following Institutions: EU Council Secretariat, EULEX Training Centre, United Nations System Staff College, Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, Egmont Institute, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, Istituto

Internazionale di Diritto Umanitario, Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Africa Peace Support Trainers' Association Secretariat, Dipartimento dell'Amministrazione Penitenziaria Italiana, Department of Peace Keeping Operations-United Nations, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Alert, EGT, Justice Rapid Response, United Nations Institute for Training and Research.

Throughout the discussions several challenges have been identified and several recommendations have been put forward in following areas:

1. The Selection of Trainers: an Examination of Key Issues
2. Enhancing Participant's Assessment: Criteria and Tools
3. Overview of Training Materials
4. Course Quality evaluation: New Trends and Tools
5. E-Learning: a Tool facilitating Harmonization?

More info on the report prepared by

E. BARAGO, A. CRETA, A. de GUTTRY (deguttry@sssup.it) - Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna - www.sssup.it

WINTER SCHOOL

PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTIONS IN EMERGENCY DISPLACEMENT

PISA, FEBRUARY 14 - 26 2011

organised by the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna
in collaboration with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

Psychosocial activities have become an indispensable component of humanitarian responses to emergency displacement. However, a non-harmonized approach to and understanding of psychosocial response usually characterizes those interventions. The Winter School aims at presenting harmonized ethics, approaches and tools within a given frame of understanding of the psychosocial dimension of displacement. The course will give an overview of both specific psychosocial programming and psychosocial approaches to different dimensions of humanitarian assistance in emergency displacement.

APPLICATION DEADLINE: EXPIRED**MORE INFO: www.itpcm.sssup.it, a.lenci@sssup.it**

training course:

HEALTH SYSTEMS THROUGH CONFLICT & RECOVERY

4 - 15 April 2011
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa

Learning Objectives

The Course aims to:

- Introduce participants to the main features of conflict-ridden environments;
- Identify and discuss the main features of health systems during protracted crises and recovery processes, and the most common distortions plaguing healthcare provision.
- Analyse and reflect upon the challenges faced by health actors in countries affected or recovering from a conflict;
- Introduce participants to recovery processes, to the dangers they pose and to the opportunities they provide for correcting long-standing distortions and creating more efficient and fair health systems;
- Familiarize participants with the existing literature in this field and stimulate their interest in conducting further research.

Deadline for application

4 March 2011, 12:00 noon (CET)

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Applications & more info:

www.itpcm.sssup.it
(section training courses & events)



BACKGROUND

Il Corso "Lavorare in ambiente ostile: profilo, competenze e strumenti pratici dell'operatore internazionale" è volto a fornire una preparazione e un bagaglio adeguati a coloro che si avvicinano per la prima volta al mondo delle organizzazioni internazionali e delle ONG; obiettivo primario del corso è mettere i partecipanti nella condizione di sapersi orientare tra quelle istituzioni e nei contesti in cui abitualmente operano, sia dal punto di vista teorico che pratico.

CORSO 6-15 LUGLIO 2011

LAVORARE IN AMBIENTE OSTILE

INFO & DOMANDE:

www.itpcm.sssup.it

ULTERIORE INFO:

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OBIETTIVI FORMATIVI

Il corso intende fornire:

- (a) una panoramica sulle maggiori organizzazioni internazionali e ONG attive a livello mondiale e regionale, in termini di strutture, status degli operatori civili e regole d'ingaggio
- (b) strumenti di analisi delle aree di crisi e di azione sul campo
- (c) capacità e competenze in risposta a situazioni di stress, pericolo e altre minacce alla sicurezza e alla salute personale.

THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL of PEACE KEEPING BUILDING OPERATIONS

SUMMER SCHOOL: 4-16 July 2011

PISA, ITALY
XVII EDITION

BACKGROUND

Over the last decades peacekeeping operations have grown rapidly in number and complexity. These developments have been reflected in the emergence of new doctrinal paradigms (e.g. the UN Capstone Doctrine) but have also been compounded by new ethical and political concerns (such as the concept of Responsibility to Protect). Operationally, 'traditional' peacekeeping has given way to complex, integrated operations which require a combination of political, military and humanitarian action. This evolution has resulted in an increased need for civilian personnel able to interact with an ever-growing number of actors and to perform the specific tasks they have been assigned.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES

The aim of the Summer School is to train participants for some of the tasks usually performed by the civilian component of peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding missions, with a specific focus on Human Rights and International Election Observation. A specific session is devoted to improve participants' capacity to design and pursue their own career path. The curriculum is divided into 4 modules: Context, Activities, Personal Profile, Career Coaching.

INFO & APPLICATION FORMS:

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e-mail: itpcm@sssup.it

TEACHING LANGUAGE: ITALIAN

COMUNICARE LA COOPERAZIONE E LA SOLIDARIETÀ INTERNAZIONALE

STRUMENTI OPERATIVI E BUONE PRATICHE

ulteriori informazioni: www.sssup.it/comunicare**PROGRAMMA DEL CORSO**

Coniugando aspetti teorici e pratici il Corso si propone di:

14 - 17 aprile 2011

analizzare l'importanza ed il ruolo della comunicazione nelle attività di cooperazione internazionale

offrire una panoramica sui principali mezzi di comunicazione e sul loro utilizzo

presentare le metodologie di comunicazione utili per raggiungere target specifici

analizzare gli elementi e le modalità di costruzione di una campagna di sensibilizzazione

presentare buone pratiche e casi studio nel settore della comunicazione in ambito internazionale

PROFILO DEI PARTECIPANTI

Il Corso si rivolge a coloro che, a titolo personale o per esigenze professionali, sono impegnati nel settore della cooperazione e solidarietà internazionale e che sono interessati ad incrementare la loro capacità di comunicare le attività promosse e i risultati raggiunti nel settore. Il numero massimo di partecipanti è stabilito in 25.

CONTATTI

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International Training Programme
for Conflict Management
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna

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IN BREVE

Data di svolgimento	14 - 17 Aprile 2011
Ore di Formazione	32
Numero massimo di partecipanti	25
Quota d'iscrizione	400,00 euro
Scadenza domande	14 marzo 2011



EUROPEAN CIVIL PROTECTION TRAINING PROGRAMME

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism was established by the European Commission at the end of 2001. It aims to facilitate, on request, the civil protection response to all types of emergencies, including natural and man-made disasters and environmental accidents occurring inside and outside the Community. By pooling the civil protection capabilities of the participating states, the Community Mechanism can ensure even better protection primarily of people, but also of the natural and cultural environment as well as property.

The Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in partnership with the Italian Civil Protection Department and the Italian Firefighters, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department is

In order to enhance coordination of civil protection assistance interventions the Commission set up a training programme for intervention teams and for the experts responsible for assessment and/or coordination. The training programme aims at improving personal response competencies and at ensuring complementarity and compatibility between intervention teams coming from different participating states.

responsible for the design, planning, conduction and evaluation of 8 Community Civil Protection Mechanism courses (8th & 9th cycle).

next courses in agenda (not open for applications)

Community Mechanism Induction Course (8CMI 10)

Location: Istituto Superiore Antincendi (ISA) - Roma
Dates: 15 - 21 January 2011

High Level Coordination Course (8HLC2)

Location: Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna - Pisa
Dates: 14 -18 February 2011

Media and Security Strategy Course (8MSC3)

Location: Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna - Pisa
Dates: 2 - 8 April 2011

Contact Person:

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THE ITPCM

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
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the itpcm & cdg base in Pisa, archive photo

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