the ITPCM
International Training Programme for Conflict Management
newsletter

in this issue: **6ᵗʰ year, n. 1**

by Andrea de Guttry

Director's greetings

Dear friends of the ITPCM,

      I am very pleased to send to all of you our warmest Greetings for a Happy Easter. This year has proved, so far, to be quite challenging for those working for the consolidation of peace and democracy and for the increased respect of human rights. The latest news coming from Palestine, Chad, Somalia, Iraq, Kenya and other difficult spots are really not encouraging and in the in the meantime they are a clear signal that the International Community, through its universal and regional

about the ITPCM:
Education & Training:

*in Italian

contributions: [click below to be redirected]

mechanisms devoted to conflict prevention and management, has still to improve its capacity to tackle rapidly and in an effective manner deteriorating situations.

The conflict prevention philosophy and approach is not yet well disseminated in the different international settings: much has still to be done.

In this framework we feel that every peace-loving human being and institution has to give his/her contribution to help changing this situation: the ITPCM is fully committed in this direction and is ready to contribute, through our research and training activities, to prepare human resources to adequately deal with these issues.

We confirm as well our full commitment to implement all our activities according to four core principles:

- **sound research and analysis** as the basis of any action;
- a **customer tailored approach** informing the design of any activity;
- **partnership** with the relevant international and national actors to guarantee institutional learning, information sharing and appropriateness of the single action for the specific scenario;
- **rigorous monitoring and evaluation** as integral part of any action undertaken.

In these days, as many of you have already noticed, we launched a brand new programme of short Training Courses through which we help to update various typologies of professionals allowing them to work more consistently in field operations. We hope that new training opportunities will meet your interest.

In the meanwhile in the next months we will be running various training activities, both here in Pisa, in Ghana (in cooperation with our local partner, the University of Ghana) and abroad: inside this issue of the Newsletter you will get a comprehensive picture of the various activities.

As the next issue of our newsletter is due to appear around July 15, 2008, we would to warmly invite all of you to send us short contributions about the activities they are carrying out or about specific issues they are dealing with: these contribution will make this Newsletter more appealing and vivid.

I wish to all of you all the best
Andrea de Guttry

The ITPCM Facts & Figures

Initiatives

In the last 5 years we have:
- delivered more than 100 **courses**:
  - **50%** of them in Italy
  - **50%** in other countries
- trained more than **5000 people**
- organised and hosted more than **30 workshops**
- conducted more than **700** ex-ante project **evaluations**
- published a number of **books**, **articles** and edited regularly the ITPCM **Newsletter**

Clients

We organise courses tailored to the needs and/or on behalf of national and international organisations. These have included: UN, EU, AU, UNAMI, UNMEE, UNMIK, UNVP, UNHCHR, OSCE, WHO, ODIHR, WFP, Carabinieri Force, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italian Civil Protection Department, Tuscany Region, national & international NGOs and private companies.

Countries

We have carried out projects in many countries, including: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Romania, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Turkey.

Networks

The ITPCM is active partner in the following networks:
- EU Group on Training (www.eutraininggroup.net)
- Consolidating the Profession:
  The Human Rights Field Officer (www.humanrightsprofessionals.org)
- International Training Programme on Peacebuilding and Good Governance (www.ug.edu.gh/itppgg/index.html)
- Network of Europeans for Electoral and Democracy Support, NEEDS (www.needs-network.org)

CORSI BREVI DI AGGIORNAMENTO

LAVORARE IN CONTESTI INTERNAZIONALI
ELEMENTI DI ANALISI E STRUMENTI OPERATIVI

up/date
corsi brevi di aggiornamento

PROGRAMMA 2008

L'ITPCM propone una serie di corsi brevi di alta formazione volti a fornire sia strumenti di analisi sia capacità operative a quanti, per percorsi lavorativi o curiosità intellettuale, sentano la necessità di affinare i propri strumenti analitici e pratici di comprensione/azione negli scenari internazionali.

Il programma dell'iniziativa si articola in 13 corsi raggruppati in 4 moduli didattici:

MODULI E CORSI		data	scadenza domanda
A **LO SCENARIO INTERNAZIONALE DEL III° MILLENNIO**			
1 ECONOMIE ILLECITE E PACI INSTABILI		**6-7 Giugno**	**9 Maggio**
2 EVOLUZIONE DEL QUADRO NORMATIVO DELLE MISSIONI INTERNAZIONALI		**12-13 Settembre**	**1 Settembre**
3 DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE UMANITARIO E NUOVE FORME DI CONFLITTO ARMATO		**24-25 Ottobre**	**26 Settembre**
B **LE ATTIVITA' E GLI STRUMENTI DEL LAVORO INTERNAZIONALE**			
1 LA FASE DI ANALISI	**B.I** IL CICLO DI VITA DEL PROGETTO E L'APPROCCIO DI QUADRO LOGICO	**18-19 Aprile**	**28 Marzo**
2 LA FASE DI PIANIFICAZIONE		**9-10 Maggio**	**11 Aprile**
3 BUDGET & RENDICONTAZIONE		**13-14 Giugno**	**16 Maggio**
4 MONITORAGGIO E VALUTAZIONE		**3-4-5 Luglio**	**6 Giugno**
1 CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT: PROTECTION CHALLENGES	**B.II** DIRITTI UMANI	**16-17 Maggio**	**18 Aprile**
C **IL PROFILO PERSONALE DELL'OPERATORE ALL'ESTERO**			
1 CAREER COACHING: PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE & TOOLS		**11-12 Luglio**	**13 Giugno**
2 MISURE DI SICUREZZA PERSONALE E GESTIONE DELLO STRESS IN AREE OSTILI		**24-25-26 Luglio**	**24 Giugno**
3 ELEMENTI DI MEDICINA PREVENTIVA, NORME D'IGIENE E TECNICHE DI PRIMO SOCCORSO		**9-10-11 Ottobre**	**12 Settembre**
D **LE ZONE CALDE DEL MONDO: CASI STUDIO**			
1 IL KOSOVO D'EUROPA: DINAMICHE, INTERVENTI, SFIDE		**23-24 Maggio**	**28 Aprile**
2 AFRICA: LE NUOVE DINAMICHE GEOECONOMICHE		**26-27 Settembre**	**4 Settembre**

I candidati possono scegliere se seguire un percorso formativo prestabilito - che dà accesso a specifici diplomi - o personalizzato, scegliendo uno o più corsi d'interesse.

INTRODUZIONE ALL'INIZIATIVA

Il sistema delle relazioni internazionali si sta evolvendo a grande velocità, cercando di adattarsi al significativo mutamento degli equilibri economici, ancor prima che politici e militari, e all'emergere di attori statuali e non che premono per ridisegnarne gli elementi essenziali. Si tratta di un sistema ancora squilibrato in cui le vecchie regole della convivenza internazionale, evolutesi dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, appaiono indebolite e meno condivise, e in qualche modo incapaci di fornire strumenti efficaci alla gestione delle sfide contemporanee. D'altra parte non sono ancora emerse delle "nuove regole del gioco" e per il momento si stenta a intravedere quale direzione prenderà o in quali forme si riorganizzerà la comunità internazionale.

Complessità e cambiamento a volte repentino delle situazioni, pongono quindi delle sfide specifiche a quanti lavorano, o desiderano lavorare, in contesti internazionali. La formazione e il costante aggiornamento diventano quindi uno strumento cruciale del personale internazionale per comprendere e affrontare queste sfide.

QUOTA D'ISCRIZIONE

La quota di iscrizione al singolo corso, inclusiva delle spese di registrazione, materiale didattico e pranzo nei giorni di effettivo svolgimento del corso, è di 230,00€.
Per chi si iscrive contemporaneamente a 3 o più corsi sarà applicata una riduzione: a partire dal terzo corso, la quota di iscrizione sarà di 195€.

QUANDO E IN QUALE LINGUA

I corsi, organizzati nell'arco di tempo tra aprile e ottobre 2008 e della durata di 2 o 3 giorni ciascuno, si svolgeranno principalmente il venerdì e il sabato (fatta eccezione per alcuni casi in cui la fromazione si terrà anche il giovedì).
Le lingue di lavoro saranno, a seconda del corso, l'italiano o l'inglese.

ULTERIORI INFORMAZIONI

Per avere maggiori informazioni sull'iniziativa (descrizione e obiettivi formativi dei singoli corsi, modalità d'iscrizione, etc.), visitare la pagina web al seguente indirizzo:

www.itpcm.sssup.it/update

Lavorare in Ambiente Ostile
10 - 18 Luglio 2008

BACKGROUND

Il Corso "Lavorare in ambiente ostile: profilo, competenze e strumenti pratici dell'operatore internazionale" consente a chi si avvicina per la prima volta al mondo delle organizzazioni internazionali e delle ONG di svolgere in maniera professionale e consapevole il proprio lavoro nei contesti difficili in cui è chiamato a operare.

OBIETTIVI FORMATIVI

Il corso, diviso in tre moduli, intende offrire ai partecipanti:
(a) un quadro generale delle maggiori organizzazioni internazionali e ONG, in termini di regole, strutture e procedure di reclutamento;
(b) le competenze pratiche per lavorare sul campo e in contesti difficili;
(c) potenziare la capacità dei partecipanti di gestire situazioni di stress/pericolo in contesti difficili.

I CONTESTO	II PROFILO PERSONALE	III CAREER COACHING
NUOVI SCENARI INTERNAZIONALI E NUOVI CONFLITTI STRUTTURE E FUNZIONAMENTO DELLE ORGANIZZAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI E DELLE ONG OPERAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI DI SUPPORTO ALLA PACE	TEAM DYNAMICS CONFLICT ANALYSIS CONFLICT RESOLUTION & NEGOTIATION INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING STRESS MANAGEMENT SICUREZZA PERSONALE MEDICINA PREVENTIVA & NORME D'IGIENE	CAREER PLANNING CV DRAFTING NETWORKING INTERVIEW SKILLS

Procedure di iscrizione

1. CHI PUÒ ISCRIVERSI

Il Corso è aperto a non più di 25 partecipanti. Fino ad un massimo del 20% dei posti può essere riservato ad Enti che abbiano stipulato apposite convenzioni con la Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna.

Il corso è indirizzato sia a giovani con poca o nessuna esperienza lavorativa, desiderosi di avvicinarsi al settore delle organizzazioni internazionali e non governative, sia a persone che aspirano ad un cambiamento professionale in questa direzione.

Prerequisiti per l'ammissione al corso sono: laurea di primo livello (o vecchio ordinamento) in qualsiasi disciplina, ovvero l'equivalente di tre anni di esperienza lavorativa in un settore afferente alle tematiche trattate nel corso; conoscenza delle lingue italiana e inglese.

3. PROCEDURE DI PARTECIPAZIONE

Ai soli candidati ammessi sarà inviata una comunicazione entro **giovedì 22 maggio 2008**. I selezionati dovranno confermare, pena l'esclusione dal corso, la propria partecipazione entro **giovedì 29 maggio 2008**. Entro la stessa data saranno tenuti a versare l'intera quota d'iscrizione, al netto dei costi del trasferimento bancario. All'inizio del Corso i partecipanti dovranno regolarizzare la propria domanda apponendovi la propria firma in originale.

2. PROCEDURE DI SELEZIONE

La domanda di partecipazione può essere registrata esclusivamente on-line al seguente indirizzo: **http://www.sssup.it/AO2008/domande/**. La domanda dovrà pervenire entro e non oltre **martedì 13 maggio 2008**. La selezione, basata sulle informazioni fornite dai candidati, sarà effettuata da una Commissione costituita ad hoc. Al termine della selezione la Commissione giudicatrice redigerà un'apposita graduatoria di merito che verrà affissa all'albo e pubblicata sul sito web della Scuola entro lunedì 19 maggio 2008. La Commissione si riserva il diritto di effettuare delle interviste telefoniche a campione.

4. CERTIFICATI E CREDITI

Alla fine del Corso sarà rilasciato un attestato di partecipazione a coloro che avranno frequentato almeno l'80% delle lezioni. Inoltre, a coloro che avranno superato un esame finale (facoltativo) potranno essere rilasciati fino a un massimo di 3 crediti formativi universitari.

A proposito del Corso

QUOTA D'ISCRIZIONE

La quota di iscrizione al Corso (comprensiva delle spese di registrazione, del materiale didattico e del pranzo nei giorni di effettivo svolgimento delle lezioni) è fissata in 950,00 Euro. La Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna mette a disposizione dei partecipanti il servizio mensa e l'uso di aule multimediali. Se disponibili, saranno concessi dei contributi finanziari.

INTERVISTE

Al termine del Corso, responsabili per le risorse umane di UNV terranno delle interviste con i partecipanti interessati in vista di un possibile impiego nel sistema ONU.

IN BREVE

Data	10-18 Luglio '08
Impegno quotidiano	7 ore
Scadenza Domande	13 Maggio '08
Quota Iscrizione	950,00 euro
CFU	3
Nr. Partecipanti	25

DIRETTORE E DOCENTI

Professor **Andrea de Guttry** è il direttore scientifico del Corso.

Il corpo docente è costituito da accademici italiani e stranieri, diplomatici, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali, ufficiali dell'esercito e rappresentanti delle ONG.

La Brigata Paracadutisti Folgore, partner nelle esercitazioni sulla Sicurezza Personale

METODOLOGIA

Accanto alle tradizionali lezioni frontali, il Corso farà ampio uso di esercitazioni pratiche, role-play, simulazioni e casi studio.

FOLLOW UP

L'ITPCM mantiene un costante contatto con i partecipanti ai propri corsi anche dopo la fine degli stessi, monitorando in particolare gli sviluppi professionali. Se autorizzato dai partecipanti, l'ITPCM può fornire nomi e contatti ad organizzazioni internazionali e non-governative che ne facciano richiesta.

THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF PEACEKEEPING & PEACEBUILDING OPERATIONS
summer school 7-19 july 2008

Background

In recent years peacekeeping operations have grown rapidly in number and complexity. 'Traditional' peacekeeping has given way to complex, integrated operations which require a combination of political, military and humanitarian action. This evolution resulted in an increased need for civilian personnel able to interact with an ever-growing number of actors while performing the technical tasks they have been given.

Training Objective

Summer School's aim is to train a limited number of participants for some of the tasks usually assigned to the civilian component of peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding missions, with a specific focus on Human Rights and on Electoral assistance and observation. The Summer School is divided into the following 4 modules:

I Context	II Activities	III Personal Profile	IV Career Coaching
Introduction to Crisis Management	Electoral Assistance	Teambuilding	Career Planning
Actors and Roles	Electoral Observation	Conflict Resolution & Negotiation	CV Drafting
Legal Framework		Intercultural Understanding	Networking
Human Rights & Int. Humanitarian Law	Human Rights Education, Monitoring & Reporting	Stress management	Interview Skills
		Personal Security & Safety	
		Medical Issues	

Application Process

Who can apply

The Summer School is open to no more than 35 participants. A maximum of 15% of the available places will be reserved for participants coming from Institutions that have concluded formal agreements with the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna.

Applicants must have a University Degree in whichever subject or the equivalent of 3 years working experience in relevant fields. They must have a good working knowledge of English.

Fee & Scolarships

The total cost for the Summer School is 1250 EURO and includes tuition fee, reference material, and lunch on class days.

Participants will be entitled to make use of the Scuola 's facilities (library, computer rooms, and canteen).

Upon request, the ITCPM staff can provide assistance in finding an accommodation.

A limited number of scholarships are provided upon request. Scholarship holders are granted a financial contribution towards meeting travel and full board expenses. Scholarships are awarded by the Selection Committee following a list drawn up on the basis of merit and need and in accordance with the availability of funds.

Selection Process

Applicants will be selected on the basis of the information provided in their curriculum vitae and in the application form. The selection will be conducted by the Admission Committee whose judgement is final. Candidates must fill in the application form available at: **www.sssup.it/pkcourse2008/domande** and attach their CV.

Applications will not be considered if, for whatever reason, they reach the ITPCM after 28 April 2008, 12 pm (Rome time).

The ITPCM will notify only the selected applicants by 5 May 2008. Selected applicants must confirm their participation by 16 May.

Certificate & Credits

Participants who have attended at least 80% of the classes receive a Certificate of Attendance. Participants who want to obtain 5 credits (awarded according to the European Credits Transfer and Accumulation System) are expected to take a multiple choice test at the end of the Course.

About the Summer School

Teaching Staff & Director

Professor **Andrea de Guttry** is the Director of the Summer School.

Lecturers and trainers are chosen among academics, diplomats, officers of international organisations, police and army officers, and NGO activists.

The **Airborne Brigade Folgore** acts as the implementing partner for the Personal Security and Safety session within the Personal Profile Module.

Methodology

The Course, in addition to general background lectures, focuses on operational procedures and practice. Many aspects are tested in practical exercises through the use of advanced role-playing sessions and simulation techniques. There is ample use of specific case study material and extensive reference is made to the field experiences of participants and teaching staff.

Follow Up

The ITPCM keeps track of the Course graduates and of their subsequent positions and assignements.

If authorized by participants, the ITPCM will submit their names to International and Non-Governmental Organisations and other relevant bodies/agencies for recruiting purposes.

Interviews

At the end of the Course, representatives of Human Resources Offices of various international institutions will hold interviews with interested participants in view of a possible recruitment.

Key Facts

Dates	7-19 July '08
Daily commitment	8 hours
Application deadline	28 April '08
Course fee	1250 euro
ECTS Credits	5
No. of Participants	35

Comunicare la Cooperazione e la Solidarietà Internazionale
15 - 18 maggio 2008

DESCRIZIONE DEL CORSO

L'obiettivo del Corso è quello di accrescere la capacità degli operatori della cooperazione internazionale allo sviluppo di comunicare/divulgare le attività promosse e diffondere i risultati raggiunti nel settore. Per gli attori istituzionali così come per il mondo del no profit impegnati nel campo della cooperazione, della solidarietà internazionale e della pace la divulgazione delle attività promosse, la diffusione dei risultati raggiunti e la connessa attività di sensibilizzazione nei confronti di specifici target e della società civile in genere, sono divenuti oggi dì fondamentale importanza. Una buona comunicazione è infatti strategica non solo per rendicontare, ma per progettare insieme il futuro e allargare la base delle risorse, sia umane che economiche in vista dell'azione politica.

PROFILO DEI PARTECIPANTI

Il Corso si rivolge a coloro che, a titolo personale o per esigenze professionali, sono impegnati nel settore della cooperazione e solidarietà internazionale e che sono interessati ad incrementare la loro capacità di comunicare le attività promosse e i risultati raggiunti nel settore. Il numero massimo di partecipanti è stabilito in 25.

PROGRAMMA DEL CORSO

Coniugando aspetti teorici e pratici il Corso si propone di:

analizzare l'importanza ed il ruolo della comunicazione nelle attività di cooperazione internazionale	offrire una panoramica sui principali mezzi di comunicazione e sul loro utilizzo	presentare le metodologie di comunicazione utili per raggiungere target specifici	analizzare gli elementi e le modalità di costruzione di una campagna di sensibilizzazione	presentare buone pratiche e casi studio nel settore della comunicazione in ambito internazionale

Procedure di iscrizione

PROCEDURE DI AMMISSIONE E SELEZIONE

I candidati sono tenuti a registrare la propria domanda di partecipazione esclusivamente on-line al seguente indirizzo: http://**www.sssup.it/comunicarecooperazione/domande/**
La domanda dovrà pervenire entro e non oltre il giorno **martedì 15 aprile 2008**. I moduli di domanda privi delle informazioni richieste non saranno presi in esame dalla commissione di selezione.
Il ritardo nell'arrivo della domanda secondo le modalità sopra indicate, qualunque ne sia il motivo, comporta l'esclusione della stessa.
La selezione sarà basata sulle informazioni che i candidati devono inserire nel modulo on-line di candidatura e sarà fatta da una commissione costituita ad hoc.
La Commissione selezionerà i candidati sulla base dei seguenti parametri:
- precedente attività nel settore della cooperazione internazionale e pace fino ad un massimo di 35 punti;
- motivazione e ruolo svolto attualmente nel settore fino ad un massimo di 55 punti;
- partecipazione a corsi fino ad un massimo di 10 punti.

Al termine della selezione la Commissione giudicatrice redigerà un'apposita graduatoria di merito che verrà pubblicata sul sito web della Scuola entro **lunedì 21 aprile 2008**.

PROCEDURE DI PARTECIPAZIONE

I selezionati dovranno confermare, a pena di decadenza, la propria partecipazione entro **lunedì 28 aprile 2008**. Entro la stessa data saranno tenuti a versare l'intera quota d'iscrizione, al netto dei costi del trasferimento bancario.

CERTIFICATI

Alla fine del Corso sarà rilasciato un attestato di partecipazione a coloro che avranno frequentato almeno l'80% delle lezioni.

A proposito del Corso

QUOTA D'ISCRIZIONE E SERVIZI OFFERTI

La quota di iscrizione al Corso (comprensiva delle spese di registrazione, del materiale didattico e del pranzo nei giorni di effettivo svolgimento delle lezioni presso la mensa della Scuola) è fissata in 350,00 Euro.
La Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna mette a disposizione dei partecipanti l'uso di aule multimediali. Inoltre, l'ITPCM offrirà ai partecipanti, che ne faranno richiesta, assistenza nella ricerca e prenotazione degli alloggi convenzionati.

CORPO DOCENTE E DIRETTORE DEL CORSO

Il corpo docente è costituito da esperti in comunicazione nello specifico settore della cooperazione internazionale.
La responsabilità scientifica e organizzativa del Corso è affidata al Prof. Andrea de Guttry, ordinario di Diritto Internazionale presso la Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna.

IN BREVE

Data di svolgimento	15-18 maggio '08
Ore di Formazione	24
Numero massimo di partecipanti	25
Quota d'iscrizione	350,00 euro
Scadenza domande	15 aprile '08
Versamento quota d'iscrizione	28 aprile '08

METODOLOGIA

La metodologia di apprendimento utilizzata all'interno del percorso formativo mira a favorire il passaggio dal sapere al saper fare attraverso l'alternarsi di lezioni frontali tradizionali, con simulazioni, team work ed esercitazioni.

LUOGO, PERIODO E ORARIO DI SVOLGIMENTO

Divisione Alta Formazione ScuolaSuperioreSant'Anna, Pisa, Via Cardinale Maffi, 27 dal 15 al 18 maggio 2008.

Giovedì 15 maggio	14:30 - 18:30
Venerdì 16 maggio	09:00 - 18:00
Sabato 17 maggio	09:00 - 18:00
Domenica 18 maggio	09:00 - 13:00

Training Activities at the University of Legon, Ghana

GHANA: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (**KAIPTC**) & International Training Programme on Peacebuilding and Good Governance for African Civilian Personnel (**ITPPGG**)

in collaboration with the University of Ghana (*Leghon Center for International Affairs in Accra*) and the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, under the financial support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with UNDESA

TRAINING ACTIVITIES FORT THE 4ᵗᴴ PHASE: 2008

FOUNDATION COURSE:
This is designed to provide an in depth understanding of the conceptual framework. It is also an introduction to the main tasks usually performed by civilian personnel in these missions. Participants are expected to apply only for ONE SESSION (18 February - 7 March 2008; 30 June - 18 July 2008, 2 March - 20 March 2009)

SPECIALISATION COURSES
These are designed to enhance the professional capacity to perform a specific task: Election Observation Course (5-16 May 2008), Election Management Course (5-16 May 2008), Human Rights Course (8-19 September 2008), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Course (10-21 November 2008), Negotiation Skills for African Diplomats (12-16 January 2009).

More Info about **deadlines** and **Partial Scholarships**
availability please contact:

Daniele Lenci
email**: d.lenci@sssup.it;**
Afua Yakohene,
email**: training@ug.edu.gh**

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Email: training@libr.ug.edu.gh
Website: www.ug.edu.gh/itppgg/index.html

I T A L Y :
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL PROTECTION, Italian Government

Technical training and skills to enhance the personal profile of the internal staff of the Department of Civil Protection, Presidency of the Italian Council of Ministers, to work in international field operations

Roma, Montelibretti,
March-April 2008
More info: itpcm@sssup.it

by Erika Conti*

TIME OF ELECTIONS IN ALGERIA

Since the 1991 Civil War, elections in Algeria have been traditionally connected to a violent political environment. In 2007 two election have been celebrated in the country. The latest held in November for local assemblies, have been widely monitored.

The civil law

Algeria, more then other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, embarked on a series of political and economic reforms in the attempt of building a political system similar to European countries. The 1989-1992 period was the most relevant one in terms of democratisation. In the mid-Eighties, an economical crisis shook the country which was already facing a profound malaise in Algerian society subjected for too long to authoritarian rule. Surprisingly, the regime responded to the crisis by opening up the political system and gave way "to a new era of pluralistic competition." President Benjadid Chadli and the Army expected that the introduction of a multi-party competition and freedom would lead to renew their legitimacy and political survival. Political changes started rapidly with the new constitution approved on 23 February 1989 and continued in the following years. The June 1990 local elections, first multi-party elections since the independence (1962) gave a stunning victory to the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut), the Islamic Front whose main propaganda was the creation of an Islamic state "baladiya islamiya" and which gained 188 seats out of 231. The international events affected the development of the transition as well. It was the time of the invasion of Kuwait when a general and spontaneous support for Saddam strengthened at the grass-root level (while the government officially condemned the action to avoid an international crisis). The FIS found itself at the helm of street demonstrations gaining even more popular consensus. Hence, it gained at the first round of the legislative elections held in December 1991. Nevertheless, in such occasion, the Army intervened and cancelled the second round, forced president Bendjedid to resign, decreed a state of emergency and banned all political parties based on religion (including the FIS). The coup-d'état provoked the explosion of a violent civil war which bathed the country in blood for more than a decade. At the political level, debate has been dominated by a long institutional instability till 1997, when new local elections were claimed. The state of emergency led to the creation of a police state atmosphere that eventually promoted militancy, prevented the emergence of political class and a genuine and independent civil society.

A scene from the film "La battaglia d'Algeri", by Gillo Pontecorvo, Italia-Algeria (1966)

The contestation during elections

Such exacerbation contributed considerably to the general sense of electoral dissatisfactions: electoral procedures, and the concept of elections were highly criticised and they lost credibility acquired with the path of democratisation previously undertaken. The 1997 elections saw the appearance of a new political party, the RND (*Rassemblement National Démocratique*) and the emergence of a new Islamic movement, considered moderate as opposed to the Islamic Front and others

armed Islamic groups active in the country. With the end of the war, occurred in 1998, Abdelaziz Bouteflika came to power launching the period of reconciliation with those who decided to lay down their armies. The agreement was formalised in 2005 when the Charter for Peace and Reconciliation was signed. It allowed thousands of armed Islamist receiving amnesty. In the meantime, violence continued until 2001. Indeed, the civil war never really ended but the government was able to isolate the remaining core of the resistance, GSPC (*Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat Algérien*).

The 2002 elections were still characterised by a political atmosphere of contestations and violence, especially in the Kabylie (well-known for the violent and bloody riots occurred in 2001-2002) where citizens under the new organisation, *Mouvement citoyen des arouches,* decided to boycott the polls.

The 2007 Local Elections

In 2007, Algerians voters went to the polls to re-elect the 389 members of the National People's Assembly, the lower house of the parliament. Elections were held in May, a month after the double terrorist attack of 11 April that targeted government headquarters, in the heart of the capital, and a police station and causing at least 33 victims and over 200 injuries. Elections, which have been boycotted by 65% of Algerians, produced no real change in the political configuration: the National Liberation Party remained the majority party but, compared to the previous parliamentary elections (2002), parties belonging to the presidential alliance registered a drop of 14.05% in the number of seats won.

Local elections have followed in November 2007. Certainly, they were characterised by an improvement in the security and economic situation and a wide consensus among political parties on the importance of elections.

Reforms were already launched in 1997, when the majority system was substituted with the proportional one and, in 2004 when new changes were approved to make the procedure more transparent (i.e. administrative commission headed by a judge for the monitoring, electoral list, the rights to appeal). Nevertheless, elections in May proved that a high degree of disaffection still existed towards elections. Hence, further amendments were approved to make the presence of small parties more difficult. Indeed, only 9 political parties were allowed to run for elections: the FLN, the RND, the *Harakat*

Administrative divisions

Algeria is currently divided into 48 wilayas (provinces), 553 dairas (counties) and 1541 baladiyahs (municipalities). The capital and the largest city of Algerian wilayas, dairas, and baladiyahs has always the same name as the wilaya, the daira, or the baladiyah it is located in, the same counts for the largest daira of the wilaya or the largest baladiyah of the daira. According to the Algerian constitution, a wilaya is a "territorial collectivity" enjoying some economic freedom, the APW, or "L'Assemblée Populaire Wilayale" (the Popular "Wilayale" Parliament) is the political entity governing a province, directed by the "Wali" (Prefect), who is chosen by the Algerian President to handle the APW's decisions, the APW has also a "president", who is elected by the members of the APW.

Moudjtamaa el Silm, the *Mouvement Al Islah*, the *Front des Forces Socialistes*, the *Movement Ennahda*, the *Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie*, the *Parti des travailleurs*, the *Front National Algérien*. Smaller parties rallied in the ASD (Alliance pour la Sauvegarde de la Démocratie). The Ministry of Interior organised 10.462 central polling stations and 43.045 local polling stations in the territorial district of the country and the Election Day was celebrated on 29 November 2007.

What appears relevant is the participation. The percentage of popular participation to local elections continue to be relatively weak (44,09%) compared to the 2002 (50,11%). Commenting the results, the Ministry of Interior and Local Authorities evaluated as ''excellent'' the level of participation, taking into account the ''terrible weather'' that invested the Northern part of the country. Indeed, some positives observations stand out. A remarkable improvement has been reached with respect to the legislative elections held in May when the percentage has not gone beyond 35%. The number of votes expressed has been 7.252.057 for the APC (*Assemblée Populaire de la Commune*) and 7.022.984 for the APW (*Assemblée Populaire de la Wilaya*) out of 18.446.626 registered voters.

Women's participation

Despite efforts by Algeria's political parties, few women have run for office in the country's double elections: during legislative elections, 1.018 female candidates out of 12.225 total candidates have participated in the competition (8,33%). At the occasion of local elections, in November, 609 female candidates

Arab Women Scarves, **by Indigo Goart, www.flickr.com**

were present and one of them head-list for APW of Otan. In the lists presented by the FLN, about 14% of the candidates were women. Surprisingly, the Islamists presented more female candidates than other political coalitions: 24% of female candidates for MSP for *wilyat* and 18% for APW. Such low female participation in politics poses serious questions about the real direction undertaken by Algeria, especially when compared to both the neighbouring countries, namely Tunisia and Morocco, and other spheres of the society where female participation is surprisingly growing. In Algeria, women represent currently the 70% of the lawyers and 60% of the judges. The presence of women also dominates the medical profession. Increasingly, women contribute more to household income than men. 60% of university students are women. It seems that a quite revolution is in act in many aspects of social life but of politics.

In the meantime, a new referendum is scheduled in the next few months calling for a constitutional reform that sources say would greatly expand president's power, giving him a 7-year mandate rather than the current one of 5 years and allowing him to run for a third term at the end of his second in 2009. The ultimate event for Algerian vibrant political arena will be, indeed,

the presidential election to be held in May 2009. In this perspective, next months will be crucial for strengthening a political environment more favourable to a wider citizens' inclusion in public affairs and, eventually, for making election procedures free and fair in the long term.

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Baladiyahs Governance Monitoring Project – Algeria

The purpose of the project is to develop a scientifically sound reporting and analysis mechanism for the forthcoming local elections in Algeria by conducting a survey on a sample of baladiyas (municipalities) in 3 different phases: before, during and after the elections. University lecturers and students are involved in the collection of data (e.g. through interviews with relevant actors), their elaboration and in the drafting of a final report to be published in French and Arabic.

Project Leader: Prof. Andrea de Guttry
Project Officer: Monia D'Amico
Research Team: in Algeria Professor Djabi Abdelnacer (Sociology); Professor Laggoune Walid (Law); Professor Rachid Tlemcani (Political Science); 3 Regional Coordinators e 12 research Assistants

International Advisory Group: Jeff Fischer-USA (Coordinator), Hannah Roberts -UK, Andrea de Guttry-Italy, Horacio Boneo-Argentina, Hussain Hindawi (Iraq)
Partner Institutions: Creative Associates Inc., Washington (www.caii.com); University of Algiers Youssef Ben Khedda (www.univ-alger.dz)
Funding Institution: US Department of State

Website:
http://www.univ-alger.dz/relex/baladiyah_presentation.htm

http://www.sssup.it/context_elenco.jsp?ID_LINK=665&area=47&page=9

by Ervjola Selenica*

Dilemmas and Challenges in post-independence Kosovo

The legally controversial declaration of independence adopted by Kosovo's parliament on February 17th does not represent the end of the 'Kosovo question'. Rather, it marks the beginning of a new phase in the region's history: this 'post-status phase' will see as protagonists the local political institutions and the international actor that is assuming the main political, economic and administrative responsibility in the region - that is, the European Union.

Kosovo was proclaimed independent as a consequence of the breakdown of international negotiations backing the Ahtisaari plan. The plan was torpedoed by the lack of political will to reach a compromise on the part of the parties. Following the declaration, the international community, the EU *in primis*, was unable to reach consensus on the act of secession, while the United Nations could not smash the very core of Security Council Resolution 1244, which is key to the legitimacy to the international presence in Kosovo. UN SC Resolution 1244 rules out that the status issue can be solved by Kosovo's governance structure.

Seen in this light, and considering the objections raised by Russia and China, the very transfer of functions from the UN mission to a EU mission cannot be regarded as uncontroversial, nor as the end of Kosovo's quasi-protectorate status. Whatever the case *de jure*, the sovereignty of Kosovo is *de facto* going to be supervised by the EU (which makes use of its so-called 'Bonn powers', even though less intrusive than in Bosnia and Herzegovina).[1]

A number of challenges lie ahead: a sustainable state endowed with solid democratic institutions cannot be expected to come into existence just as a result of strong independence drive that permeated Kosovo's political life on the side of its Albanian majority.

Expectations that economic development can be attained thanks to the resolution of the political status of the region are unwarranted. Virtually no evidence exists from other cases of post-conflict settings where the solution of a status issue was *per se* accompanied by major inflow of market-driven foreign direct investments propelling a virtuous cycle of growth and development. If anything, Bosnia shows that this is a dangerous myth.

The vast majority of Kosovo Albanians have attached to the status issue a talismanic quality, believing that once this is set apart, everything will spontaneously unfold positively. If anything, one can expect that once the myth is unmasked, economic and social issues will come to the light and finally request policy answers. Among the most pressing problems are the stagnation of the economy, high rates of unemployment (in a demographically booming society), and wide gray and black sector where various forms of organized crime, corruption and clientelist practices are rooted.[2]

Giant poster of ex presidente Rugova facing the statue of a UÇK soldier, by Giovanni Ricco

1   Osservatorio Balcani, 19 Feb. 2008.

2   Osservatorio Balcani, 25 Feb. 2008.

The role the EU is assuming in this post-status phase goes beyond economic and reconstruction tasks, which Bruxelles has been leading already under the civilian administration of UNMIK. The deployment of two specific missions – EULEX and the International Civilian Office (ICO) - adds up to the existing perspective of integration in the European Union, a perspectives that Kosovo shares with the other countries of the Western Balkans. EULEX, an emanation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), represents a continuation of past experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Macedonia, but is by all means the biggest and most ambitious EU mission in civil crisis management. It will have, in the first place, a *"monitoring, advicing and mentoring role"* in areas concerning the rule of law, police and the judicial sectors. It will perform a role in crime contrast strategies, and its limited executive powers will be exercised together with the special EU representative heading the ICO. The latter is a smaller mission that will gradually absorb the civilian and administrative powers of UNMIK, but the definition of its role and prerogatives have proved to be quite difficult.

The presence of the EU in Kosovo is thus moulded by two main policy frameworks: the ESDP and the enlargement policy of the Union. The way the EU will manage its usual dilemma between the priorities of ESDP and those of the enlargement policy is therefore going to be of critical importance. The EU is confronted with a paradox: on the one hand, it is the main interlocutor of local leaders to whom all sovereign powers are to be transferred; on the other, it has the strategic interest - in view of its enlargement to the region – to give priority to fighting the organized crime and to disrupt the marriage between mafia and politics, an action that requires a strong political will, and which may have destabilizing effects on the political landscape, at least in the short run, and backfire in terms of delegitimization of the EU mission itself.[3] This type of dilemmas represent one of the main challenges for EU in Kosovo given the fact that on this type o questions UNMIK proved deficient.

Another type of doubts concern the sheer size, executive power and prerogatives of the Europea

commitment. How and to what extent can a mission with less instruments and human resources do better than the previous one? Moreover, in spite of a certain display of optimism, the EU performance in economic development and reconstruction cannot be depicted as wholly positive: contradictory results have emerged. Summing up, the EU is embarking on a risky mission, where it has a high stake (its own credibility, after the initially disastrous response to the Balkan wars of the 1990s) but where political support is not granted.

Key to overcoming these dilemmas becomes developing a EU approach to that goes beyond narrowly conceived security and stabilization strategies/priorities, and that integrates the ESDP mission with other dimensions of EU soft-power, such as a sound understanding of socio-economic development in a postwar situation, the political involvement via ICO, and the integration within the EU family in the end. A multi-sector approach is thus necessary, combining the fight against nationalist extremism and organized crime, on the one hand, with long-term objectives of institutional reforms and socio-economic development. This is at the same time an opportunity and a challenge, since much of its success will depend on the degree of coordination between different actors and offices in Brussels and in the field, and in the tensions that often exist between objectives and competences.

source: http://www.maic.jmu.edu/journal/9.1/Profiles/kosovo_map.jpg

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3   Rotta and Strazzari: in Aspenia, March 2008.

The way the Kosovo status was resolved reflects the limits of nation-state logic in the Balkans. Not surprisingly, the days following the declaration of independence saw international concern growing due to several episodes related to an

plan.[4]

The question of the division of the territory leads one to consider the situation of the Serbian enclaves in the rest of Kosovo. The political leaders of these areas have made clear their opposition to a scenario of fragmentation along ethnic lines, which may look preferable to the Serbs in the North. In case of a partition, a likely scenario could be one of mass migration towards Serbia, not necessarily triggered by large scale violence such as the one perpetrated by Albanians in March 2004.

In June 2008 an international donor conference for Kosovo will meet. After almost a decade of international supervision the economy is heavily dependent on

DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC ALBANIANS AND SERBS IN KOSOVO

issue that risk to become Kosovo's new Achilles' heel: the area of Kosovska Mitrovica in the North. Since 1999, the region to the north of Ibar river has been *de facto* depending on Serbia. After the proclamation of independence, the last institution depending on Pristina, the judicial authority, was taken under the control of the Serbian employees working there before 1999. Moreover, what seems to be an even more dangerous signal is the resignation of Serbian police officers serving in the KPS (the Kosovo Police Service monitored by the UNMIK-EULEX). The local Serb community voiced its will to create a parallel police force that will co-operate with UNMIK and KFOR but not with EULEX, that is considered to be stepmother of Kosovo's illegal independence. This entails two potentially explosive elements: the formation of a (para-)military force entirely drafted along ethnic lines and the lack of recognition of EULEX, seen as an expression of the 'treacherous' Ahtisaari

external aid and migrants' remittances, and the informal economy accounts for the vast majority of a GDP that gives virtually no signs of growth. The lack of cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina digs a deeper ditch in a region that is full of regional imbalances, and where the secession of Kosovo risks fusing new instability. Repercussions in Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina) as well as in the Republic of Macedonia or in the Serbian Presevo valley are probably not to be visible in the short run, but they can in no way been ruled out in the middle term. Above all, Kosovo north risks becoming for post-status Kosovo what Kosovo has long been for Serbia: a perfect excuse for postponing social, political and economic reforms that would undermine the power of nationalist cliques, and set the country along the path that goes to Europe.

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4   Osservatorio Balcani, 25 Feb. 2008.

by Rocco Nuri*

The Legal Status of Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon: state's obligations and violations

The Iraqi refugee crisis is different from other refugee crisis of the past: indeed, it has occurred over the past 4 years and a half and it did not result in the settlement of endless refugee camps scattered within the borders of Iraq's neighboring countrie where they have hardly received legal protection. Lebanon is a telling case.

Over 4 millions Iraqi nationals are currently displaced due to persecution and sectarian violence. More than 2 millions crossed Iraq's borders in search for safety, leaving their country by their own car, taxi or bus. Once arrived in host countries, they settled amongthelocal populations, sharing the

same language and similar culture. However, Iraqi refuges are not less vulnerable for the fact to be urban refugees. Like any refugee, Iraqis are in need of protection.

Lebanon, currently hosting 40,000 Iraqis, proved to perform low in providing them with effective protection. Lebanon is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor to the 1967 Protocol. Additionally, it is not willing to act as an asylum country due to the fear to have to carry once again a burden which will carry on for decade after decade, like the case of Palestinians.

Moreover, Lebanon has not even a rudimentary asylum system. The only reference to asylum is found in the 1962 Law of Entry and Exit, which dictates not to expel those who have been granted political asylum to the territory of a state where their life or freedom would be in danger. However, the right to political asylum has been rarely used and it does not apply to Iraqi refugees.The standard response to Iraqi refugees was to treat them as illegal migrants liable, to imprisonment, fines and deportation.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) attempts to provide Iraqis with a legal status proved unsuccessful. The temporary protection regime set up by UNHCR to respond to the Iraqi large-scale displacement showed soon its weakness. First of all, the assumption on which it was based did not come true: the political settlement of Iraq immediately after the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein. Second, it focuses on return as the most appropriate solution and lacks a time-frame for its implementation. This regime was unable to protect Iraqis who fled violence, leaving them in a situation of legal uncertainty where their rights are not clear and

guaranteed, being them neither refugees nor non-refugees.

Acting under the framework of the temporary protection regime, UNHCR succeeded to engage Lebanese authorities in taking a slightly clearer position on the Iraqi refugee issue. As a result, UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Lebanon's General Security. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) legalizes the presence of Iraqi refugees and asylum-seekers for a period of one year, but it does not compel Lebanon to act as an asylum country. As a matter of fact, UNHCR has three months to complete the process of determining refugee status and then other nine months to find a resettlement solution for those Iraqi asylum-seekers who have been recognized as refugees. Iraqi refugees who are not granted with a resettlement solution by twelve months after their registration with UNHCR are no longer covered by the MoU and are considered illegal. After this time, there are no obligations on Lebanese authorities preventing them from arresting, detaining and deporting the refugee status claimant. Moreover, the MoU covers only those who entered the country illegally and who registered with UNHCR within two months of their entry in the Lebanon. All Iraqis who are under temporary protection regime but who do not

meet the conditions provided for by the MoU are considered illegal migrants and therefore liable for arrest and detention.

At the end of 2006, UNHCR called upon states to declare Iraqis from southern and central Iraq as refugees on a prima facie basis. Prima facie refugee status determination is based on the idea that Iraqis who are outside their country and are unwilling or unable to return due to the situation of conflict and generalized violence may be presumed to need international protection and are, therefore, persons of concern of UNHCR. Even this procedure did not provide Iraqis displaced inside Lebanon with higher standards of protection, leaving them at a constant risk of being arrested for illegal entry and stay in Lebanon and sentenced to imprisonment and deportation.

While Lebanon does not trace all illegal Iraqis in order to arrest them, the Lebanese authorities have not acknowledged the need of international protection for Iraqis. Therefore, they have not issued explicit and clear instructions to law-enforcement officials not to arrest Iraqi refugees for illegal entry or stay in Lebanon. The fact that Lebanon is not a party to the Refugee Convention and the lack of a national asylum system are no justifications to disregard international obligations and to discharge responsibilities which Lebanon holds in respect to Iraqi refugees. As stated in its Constitution, Lebanon is a "founding and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights".

As a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee, the UNHCR's governing body, Lebanon should follow its Conclusions which call upon national legislation and/or administrative practice to make the necessary distinction between the situation of refugees and asylum-seekers, an that of other aliens. Being adopted by consensus by Executive Committee member states, the Conclusions represent the view of the international community and carry persuasive authority.

Being illegal entry not a crime under international protection standards, any kind of punitive detention amounts to a human rights violation.

Lebanon ignored also the statements and case law produced by the Human Rights Committee, which in 1997 pointed out that detention is justified in case the government, on a single judicial base, is able to provide evidence that the person will flee, destroy evidence or pose a risk to society. The detention of Iraqi refugees and asylum-seekers in Lebanon is widely based on their illegal entry, remains unquestioned and

justified under the Law of Entry and Exit which does not require the state give reasons for the detention of a foreigner.

Repatriation of Iraqi detainees as long as it was being implemented, regardless the risk posed to the returnee's life and freedom, might constitute refoulement, in violation of art.3 of the CAT, to which Lebanon is a party since 2000. In principle, the Lebanese authorities did not return Iraqi refugees to Iraq against their will. In practice, the opposite occurred. Indeed, when Lebanon presented the Iraqis sentenced for illegal entry with the choice to decide between prolonged detention and returning to Iraq, it forced them to opt for return, being the other option repugnant.

Lebanon is bound to respect the principle of non-refoulement not only in virtue of treaty-based obligations. Indeed, it is a norm of customary international law, in that applying to all states regardless they are a party or not to international human rights instruments. Detention itself does not amount to a breach of human rights, unless it becomes arbitrary. The way Lebanon is implementing non-refoulement by keeping in prolonged imprisonment those Iraqi detainees who have completed their sentence for illegal entry may amount to arbitrary detention..

According to art.9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Lebanon is a party since 1972, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary detention". The UN Human Rights Committee elaborated on the concept of arbitrariness when dealing with the case of A vs. Australia in 1993. Arbitrariness does not necessarily means acting against the law but must include elements of inappropriateness and injustice. In order to avoid being arbitrary, detention must be necessary and reasonable in all the circumstances. Therefore, detention should not be prolonged over the term for which a state can provide appropriate justification. It is well-rendered that the practice of Lebanon to prolong detention for Iraqis who have already served their sentence as a way out to avoid committing refoulement is not justifiable.

MoA in Human Rights and Conflict Management at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in Pisa, Academic Year 2006-07

IRAQI ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN 2006
(SELECTED COUNTRIES)

source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees

by Laura Rudel*

UN and violence against children: the way forward

The UN Study on Violence against Children conducted by Prof. Pinheiro has led the 62nd Session of the General Assembly (GA), in the annual Resolution on the rights of the child, to request the Secretary General (SG) for the appointment of a Special Representative (SRSG) on the issue. On the other hand, the GA failed once again in addressing the problem of corporal punishment.

Background

With Resolution 56/138, the General Assembly requested the SG to conduct an in-depth study on the issue of violence against children. The SG Kofi Annan appointed Mr. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro on 12 February 2003 to conduct the study which was launched on November 20, 2006.

The Study and the World Report on Violence against Children are the first comprehensive UN documents to consider children as human rights bearers, with an undeniable right to express their views on all matters affecting them.

They provide a global picture of the magnitude of the problem proposing recommendations for the advancement of legislation, policy and programmes for fighting violence against children.

It was conducted through an intensive consultative and participatory process including nine regional consultations involving governments, civil society, and children, which was doubtless one of its strength.

The Study considerates different contexts in which violence occur: public and private settings such as schools, detention facilities and prisons, sports, streets and work situations. It also poses its attention on the great challenge of banning corporal punishment, an issue which has been debated for years.

Violence in the home and family

Although families should be the natural environment for children to grow up, unfortunately not all of them are a safe place.

Perpetrators often enjoy large impunity, because of victims' fear or because children complaints are rarely taken seriously or other members of the family tend to be a party to those responsible.

Factors contributing to violence have been identified as child-related, which take into account individual characteristics of the child as age, stage of development, sex; family-related, which are linked to the characteristics of parents and caregivers; societal and cultural.

Other factors include lack of policies regarding education, child care, health care, social security. These elements should lead us to considerate how global income inequality, globalization and migration, affect the well-being of children in respect of their physical and mental integrity.

Violence in the schools and the issue of corporal punishment

Schools are too often places of violence and abuse which undermine children's opportunities to learn, causing psychological trauma, physical injury, disability and even death.

Central in the Study is the issue of corporal punishment which afflicts children both at home and in schools. Corporal punishment can be defined as any punishment in which physical force is intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort.

In at least 65 countries corporal punishment is permitted as a method of school discipline.

Children are spanked, caned, strapped, beaten by teachers as a result of misbehaviour, poor academic performance or for no reason at all.

The imperative to ban corporal punishment is a human rights one. It indeed breaches fundamental rights to respect human dignity and physical integrity, values that are protected under the CRC, which requires States to "protect children from all forms of physical and mental violence".

Despite some significant progress on prohibition of corporal punishment by 2006 , in most countries it still is a traditional practice, that is why working on the "legal side" is not enough. Supportive and educational, not punitive, interventions and alternative non-violent methods of disciplines should be promoted instead.

In this regard, we must consider the annual Resolution on the Rights of the Child adopted by the GA on 18th December 2007. As in the past recent years, the Resolution on the Rights of the Child has been presented by the EU together with GRULAC, a regional group within the UN formed by Latin-American and Caribbean States.

A great number of countries, especially among the Caribbean ones, claimed the right of legally allowing some degree of punishment of their children in their domestic law, and repeatedly affirmed it to be a national matter which cannot be influenced by any outside intervention which is deemed as an imposition of a different culture.

A choice seemed to be imperative for the EU at that stage: keep the partnership of GRULAC which was considered essential by many EU partners and present the Resolution together, or give it up and have the corporal punishment included in the Resolution. The choice was not easy because another important issue was on the table: the need to call for the appointment of a SRSG on Violence against Children, as recommended by the Study of Professor Pinheiro. This was seen by all States involved as the priority number one in the overall strategy of addressing the problem of violence against children and was finally accepted by "our counterparts" after long negotiations. Some EU countries therefore saw this agreement on the SRSG as a concession from GRULAC of such importance to be maintained at all costs, even if the cost was the corporal punishment.

The novelty of the 62nd Session

The failure on corporal punishment gives rise to many reflections on the possible further action at UN level on the matter. A change in the way of approaching the issue of the rights of the child is needed.

In the 62nd Session an historical novelty

WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN

WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN

Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro
Independent Expert for the United Nations
Secretary-General's Study on Violence against Children

18

occurred which is going to have recoils on the UN approach to human rights issues: the adoption of the Resolution for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty.

The negotiations of this resolution have been conducted in a manner which is absolutely innovative. For the first time the urgency of the matter broke all regional blocks creating a transregional alliance which at the end was successful over the expectations. What emerged is an important lesson: some issues have the power and strength of breaking the traditional conflicting groups existing within the UN system: north-south, developed-developing countries. These groups came together to agree on a text that was at the end felt as shared and owned by all.

The issue of the rights of the child is of such a nature that should be treated consistently. Keeping it as an initiative of one group or two has proved to be ineffective in terms of results. A transregional alliance could instead help going straight to the objectives, achieving a better phrasing of the Resolution, which has become repetitive through the years.

The way forward

Because violence against children relates to the mandates of multiple UN bodies and agencies, a high-level post is critical to ensure leadership and facilitate effective cooperation among them. There are substantial areas of violence that are not covered by existing special procedures or mechanisms, and thus remain unaddressed. A SRSG would comprehensively deal with all aspects of violence against children in all settings.

The key elements of his/her mandate should include advocacy, monitoring of the Study's recommendations, assessment of progress, raising awareness on the issue and ensuring children's participation, all of which have been taken into account in the text of the Resolution.

The way forward in fighting violence against children cannot prescind from and integrated and multisectoral approach that consider all essential aspects of the well-being of children in all different environments where they grow up. All must be considered as interdependent and subordinated in their realization and cannot be approached apart from each other as have happened for far too long.

In these efforts centrality must be recognized to the involvement of children. They have the capability to become authors and inspirers of adults' interventions, not only passive recipients. Making their voices heard is the most challenging match to win in the future.

Mom, **photo hues by drey**

MoA in Human Rights and Conflict Management at the Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna in Pisa, Academic Year 2006-07

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The dual EU-UN peacekeeping mission in CHAD: current challenges and prospects

The mission in Chad represents the first time for EU and UN together under a single Security Council Resolution. This is a practical innovation in view of combining military and the police efforts in peace keeping. Five months since this innovative step, and four months into the operational phase of the mission, the situation has only grown dire with each passing day. What could be the problem and what can be done?

Introduction

The five-year Darfur conflict has spilled over into Chad and coupled with the already existing internal squabble, resulted in severe deterioration of peace, security and humanitarian conditions. By September 2007, there were over 400.000 refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Eastern Chad.[1] This called for attention and the international community responded swiftly. A United Nations' Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) was passed, creating a hybrid mission of the European Union (European Union Force in Chad and the Central African Republic – EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) and the United Nations (United Nations' Mission in Central African Republic and Chad – MINUCRAT).[2] This marked the first time ever that the EU and UN were to operate under a single UNSCR for one year. This is a practical innovation in view of combining military and the police efforts in peace keeping. Five months since this innovative step, and four months into the operational phase of the mission, the situation has only grown dire with each passing day. What could be the problem and what can be done?

The hub of this paper is an examination of the current situation in Chad in the light of the challenges faced by the hybrid mission. This work will equally attempt at generating some recommendations towards improving the hybrid mission's work and prospects. Discussions will orbit around key themes like; modern peace keeping, human rights/humanitarian field operation, responsibility to protect, IDPs, military and civilian peace keeping.

The context

A brief examination of the Chadian context reveals that in 2006 and early 2007, hundreds of civilians were killed and more than 100.000 thousand Chadians displaced by militia violence in Eastern Chad, where more than 230.000 Sudanese refugees live in an increasing precarious security environment.[3] Three, sometimes overlapping, patterns of violence figure prominently in Chad's armed conflict: internal armed conflict between the Chadian government and its armed opposition groups; cross-border militia attacks against civilians by armed Sudanese rebels; and communal violence among the ethnic groups in particularly the Northern region of Chad. Chronic instability and rampant violence is therefore a common phenomenon. This situation shames

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1   Human Rights Watch, "Ensuring Civilian Protection in Chad: The Proposed UN Mission" Background Briefing, February 21, 2007.

2   Amnesty International, Public Statement AI Index: AFR 20/011/2007 (Public) News Service No: 184, 26 September 2007, "CHAD: UN Security Council Resolution a Step Forward in Protecting Civilians but Concerns Remain"

3   Human Rights Watch, "Ensuring Civilian Protection in Chad: The Proposed UN Mission"

the Chadian government's effectiveness in providing sustainable peace and security to its citizenry. The apparent security vacuum has thus created pressing needs for civilian protection, if the ceaseless brush of unbridled violence perpetuated against unarmed civilian communities is to be halted. It was thus in a feat of reasserting its overarching obligation to protect the civilian population that the UNSC authorized a UN/EU Mission to Chad.

The Mandate

EUFOR and MINUCRAT are two separate bodies both mandated by the same Security Council resolution 1778 (2007) of 25 September 2007, marking the first time in the world that an EU military force and a UN mission are combined in a single UN mandate. According to this resolution, EUFOR and UN are broadly meant to: protect civilians in danger and particularly the refugees and the IDPs; ease humanitarian aid deliveries and ensure safe corridors for the movement of aid workers for a period of one year. The mandate has both a police and military component.

MINUCRAT is specifically charged with training police and reinforcing the judicial infrastructure, such as prisons and courts, so that local police are able to deal with "daily life challenges." It will deploy inside camps for refugees from Darfur and sites for Displaced Chadians in the East, and offer police escorts for aid agencies working in the region. It will compliment the work of the Chadian Police and troops that have largely failed to prevent the camps from sometimes being overrun by rebels from Sudan, or keep workers safe.[4]

EUFOR is expected to provide the general security of civilians whilst MINUCRAT provides security in the Eastern zone out side the refugee and IDP camps. It is also authorized to use military force, where necessary, to prevent incursions into the area. [5]

Other documents which serve as a legal basis for the UN/EU operation include: the Joint Council Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007 on the EU military operation in Chad and CAR; the Council Decision of 28 January 2008 on the launching of the EU military operation in the region; and the Council Joint Action 2008/110/CFSP of 12 February amending and extending the mandate.[6] This mission, no doubt, had all the necessary legal framework of operation. It was now time to move the paper to the field. However, the realities on the ground reserved huge challenges for the brand new hybrid system.

Deployment in Chad and Central African Republic," August 27, 2007.

5   Ibid.

6   The Council of the European Union, "EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, Legal Basis." http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1367&lang=en

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4   The Associated Press, International Herald Tribune, "UN Security Council gives Green Light to New

Lake Chad Polders, Chad, photo Klaus Jacobis

Challenges

The system began facing operational challenges even before the official start date scheduled for November 2007. The first challenge to be cited here is that of **logistics**. The urgent deployment of troops was retarded because it was faced with logistical constraints. EUFOR Chad is said to be the most multinational operation conducted by the EU in Africa with 14 member states on the field (Chad) and 22 at the Operational Head Quarter (Mont Valérien, France).   It is to operate some 2.000km away from the nearest port and cover a vast surface area of some 350.000 km square (135.000 square miles); a situation which is further compounded by the lack of sufficient equipments and money – the common costs budget for the military operation stands at 119.6 million Euros. This for sure, is a "logistical Everest."[7]

There is also the problem of high insecurity due to constant **rebel interference**. This has greatly impeded the mission's efforts at easing humanitarian aid deliveries. In December alone, 6 attacks on humanitarian aid workers and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) was recorded in Chad. This forced UNHCR to relocate from East to the South of Chad.[8] Again, the recent rebel attack on Djamena, 2-3 February 2008, sent the civilian population into panic and exacerbated the situation.

Once again; thousands of Chadians were displaced, rendered homeless and insecure.[9] This is a destabilizing factor.

The mission also has the challenge of dealing with **increase threat of conflict between Chad and neighboring Sudan**. Each side accuses the other of seeking to destabilize the already tense and volatile border by backing and harboring rebel movements. Sudanese government backed militias have a record of constantly attacking the Darfur refugees in Chad. Chad's government has, equally, carried out bombing raids in Darfur, arguing that it was targeting rebels opposed to the Chadian government. Faced with this EUFOR/MINUCRAFT can do very little as its mandate is strictly limited to Chad and the CAR and not Sudan.[10] This poses a Herculean challenge to the mission's success.

The mission lacks the most vital legitimacy of "**perceived neutrality.**" France, the brain behind the hybrid system and largest troop contributor to this mission, has troops permanently stationed in Chad and has even lent military support to the government in fighting rebel insurgencies. The rebel spokesman, Aduraman Koulamallah, accused France of being "totally involved in the war and has no legitimacy to take part in an international force."[11] This has greatly diluted EUFOR's status as "independent, impartial and neutral." Dispelling this perspective and regaining confidence is, no doubt, a huge challenge for the hybrid mission.

Humanitarian Officers also have their worries and confusion regarding the system of operation of the dual mission system. As Guinlhelm Molinie, Head of Médicins Sans Frontières Luxemburg which works in Eastern Chad argues;

> *We have our questions about the deployment. We don't know if it is to protect humanitarians, refugees, the areas of return, the Eastern Chad. The official line varies. We are waiting to see how this force will act on the ground and whether it*

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7   European Union@United Nations Partnership in Action, "EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RAC)," January 28, 2008.

8   IRIN Africa/West Africa/Chad/Dual Peace Keeping Mission seeks to Dispel Confusion. 11 January 2008.

9   BBC/ NEWS/WORLD/AFRICA/Back to the Battlefield in Chad by Stephanie Hancock; Hancock, Chad Scourged by Days of Battles; BBC NEWS/WORLD/ AFRICA/ Eyewitness: "Revolution is Going on," Sunday 03 February 2008; Thousands Fleeing in Chad.

10   BBC NEWS/WORLD/AFRICA/ Q&A: Chad Rebellion.

11   WOW Gambia News Com, "Chad: Wounded Soldiers Crowd Hospitals as Fighting Intensifies"; IRIN Africa/West Africa/Chad/ "Chad : Dual Peace Keeping Mission"; Un Dispatch Posts on the UN, "France Proposes EU-UN Operation in Chad and CAR, August 22,2007.

continued

will do any good. We have some doubts about it, that's for sure.[12]

The challenges are indeed enormous, but the dual mission has been able to successfully operate to some extent, amidst many inherent setbacks. At this point, it is important to find out what the mission has done so far, in the face of these challenges, and what could be done to improve performance.

What has been done?

Concerning the logistical challenge, the UN has urged member states to contribute to the hybrid mission. In response, France, which has been pushing hardest for the EUFOR/MINUCRAT deployment, upped its contribution on January 10th 2008. It offered to provide 2.000 of the 3.700 troops required, roughly 10 helicopters and 500 extra men for logistical support.[13] 70 Austrian troops have already joined EUFOR in Chad;[14] and further contributions are expected from Ireland, Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden.

N'Djamena, Chad, Grand Marché, photo by Sachara

In response to the recent rebel interference, the UNSC expressed concerns regarding the direct threat that the combat pose for safety of the civilian population including IDPs and refugees. It reaffirmed it full support for the hybrid mission and underlined its responsibility to protect. It gave support to regional peace efforts made by the AU towards resolving the conflicts.[15] This boosted the morale of the

hybrid force, which advanced courageously amidst the rebel interference. They were able to resist the rebels and push them across the border. As such, they succeeded in quelling some hostilities (at least for now), that of 2-3 February 2008.

EUFOR have been patrolling the Sudan–Chad border line in a bid to preventing border conflict between these two countries.

France has also made attempts towards dispelling the questions on its neutrality by stating that its present work in Chad is strictly in line with the hybrid mandate. So far, it is trying to match words with actions. Since the recent attacks, France has deployed extra troops to evacuate foreign nationals, but has stopped short of its previously overt support to the country's government. France's recently installed President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has pledged to break with his country's historically opaque relationship with African countries and to operate through multilateral mechanisms.

In a bid to clear the ambiguity with humanitarian organizations, MINURCRAT launched an information campaign to explain its duties and how it differs from EUFOR.

It should be recalled that the mission is only a quarter ways gone in the duration of its mandate. It has a long way to go in the next eight months and the task is colossal.

Recommendations

The situation in Chad is delicate and complex with profound regional dimensions. If Chad is destabilized, the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur will overflow to the entire Central African region. Speaking at the African Union Meeting in Addis Ababa, the Chadian Foreign Minister warned that "we are going to have a dramatic and catastrophic situation in the whole sub-region [if nothing is done]."[16] Prevention is certainly better than cure. The necessity for the hybrid mission to succeed therefore cannot be overemphasized. For it to succeed there is need for some improvements.

The EU/UN mission should be empowered to act more forcefully, not just on paper (the

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12   IRIN Africa, "Chad: Dual Peacekeeping Mission"

13   Ibid.

14   Al Jazeera English News, "Austria Bolsters EU Mission in Chad."

15   AllAfrica.com, Chad, "Security Council Presidential Statement Condemns Attacks Against Government."; Noli Irritare Leones, Blog Archives; "A

New Security Council resolution Opposes Attacks on the Government of Chad."

16   IRIN Africa/West Africa/Chad/ CHAD: Foreign minister pleads for international intervention. February 5.

mandate) but on the ground. This requires the presence of a robust force able to deter militia attacks and, at the same time, protect the IDPs, refugees and humanitarian workers albeit the conflict in Chad. Securing main roads for civilian and humanitarian traffic and proactively patrolling rural areas is an important task for the UN mission, and one which would require significant human, logistical and technical capacity, including a high degree of mobility and the ability to rapidly react to ambushes and reports of impending attacks. The UN Security Council should call on member states to immediately provide funds for and be prepared to provide technical and logistical support, personnel and troops, and rapid response capabilities to the proposed UN mission in Chad.

It is important for this mission to have a mastery of both the context in which its operation is based, as well as the regional dimensions of the conflict. The crises in Chad and Darfur are independent problems that have become interconnected in a volatile region with porous borders by the actions of non-state actors and governments such as Chad, Sudan and Libya. Ultimately, resolving these problems will require regional analysis and regional solutions. UN political work in Chad should be coordinated with parallel efforts in Darfur and ideally would also focus on the broader goal of peace facilitation in the region.

The hybrid mission would require sustained political support, commitment and sufficient resources from regional organizations such as the EU, AU and the Arab league.

It is important for France to stick to its pledge to remain neutral and work solely under the UN mandate. She must endeavour to recant from her nasty credential of meddling with the sovereignty of States in pursuit of her self-centered strategic, economic and political interests. Doing "business as usual" in a situation like this would only endanger the lives of civilians and humanitarian aid workers.

There is also need for continuous dialogue and cooperation between and among EUFOR, UN Police and the Humanitarian Officers.

In the short term, an international protection mission would not be sufficient to end all attacks against civilians in eastern Chad, particularly those attacks that are related to the Darfur

conflict, which have a destabilizing influence on the wider region. Accordingly, the Security Council should at a minimum impose targeted sanctions on senior Sudanese government officials for their failure to end attacks on civilians and other violations of international humanitarian law, and their persistent refusal to accept the full deployment of the proposed African Union-United Nations hybrid international force. This is a key strategy in reversing the perpetuation of abusive policies in Darfur.

Finally, it is important for the international community at this initial stage, to make allowance for sustainability in the long run.

Conclusion

The EU/UN mission in Chad can be said to be a practical attempt at instituting Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in UN peace building efforts. The UN should be commended for this initiative. This illustrates that the UN is keen on implementing the lessons learnt from past conflict situations. The tasks have been well defined and duties assigned according to competences. EUFOR and UN police are ideal for their military and police roles, respectively, in this conflict. Being the inaugural CIMIC attempt between the UN and EU, challenges abound inter alia the conflict situation in Chad. However, given the resources, it has the potential of fulfilling its mandate and creating an environment whereby IDPs and refugees would return home in safety. Of course the situation in Sudan remains a key determinant factor. There is need to recognize the interconnected nature of the conflicts and urge the States of this region to cooperate with a view to ensuring their common stability.

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CHAD: country profile

BASIC INFORMATION

Area: 1,284,000 sq km (496,000 sq miles)

Population: 9.8 million (2006 est.)

Capital City: N'Djamena (population 700,000 est)

People and languages: The population of Chad is made up of 200 ethnic groups. The official languages are French and Arabic but local languages are widely used (Sara in the south, Arabic, Ouadi and Toubon in the north).

Religions: Islam (which predominates in the north), Christianity (which predominates in the south) and indigenous beliefs are all practised. Currency: CFA Franc (Fixed to Euro)

Major Political Parties: Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), Action for a Federal Republic (FAR), National Rally for Democracy and Progress (VIVA-RNDP), National Union for Development and Renewal (UNDR), Party for Liberty and Development (PLD) and Union for the Republic and Democracy (URD).

Head of State: President Idriss Deby Prime Minister: Nouradine Kassire Coumakoye.

Membership of international groups/organisations: African Union (AU), Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC), African Development Bank (AFDB), International Organisation of the Francophonie (OIF), Community of Saharan and Sahelian States (CENSAD /COMESSA).

GEOGRAPHY

Chad is surrounded on 3 sides by mountain ranges. Apart from the fertile lowlands in the south, the country is arid in the centre and largely desert in the mountainous north. The population is concentrated in the south. Chad has borders with Libya, Niger, Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Sudan.

Access to Information and Technology, 1999-2002

Chad Sub-Saharan Africa World

Foreign Direct Investment and Total Debt Service, Chad

Foreign Direct Investment Total Debt Service

Population by Age Group, Chad, 1975-2025

<15 years 15-65 years >65 years

POLITICS

Political negotiations over constitutional arrangements were cut short in 1989 when one of Habre's former security chiefs Idriss Deby launched a rebellion from the Darfur region of Sudan. He overthrew Habre in November 1990. A national conference was eventually convened in January 1993, but a new constitution was not approved until 1996. It was followed in the same year by presidential and multi-party legislative elections. Deby was confirmed as President, amid opposition claims of fraud.

In 1994, the International Court of Justice ruled in favour of Chad in the dispute with Libya over the Aouzou strip. Libyan withdrawal began shortly after. In June 1997 however a new rebellion emerged in the North - the Movement for Justice and Democracy in Chad (MDJT), led by former Defence Minister Youssof Togomini. Despite at times deploying thousands of troops, the Chadian Government has been unable to defeat it, although there have been periodic peace agreements. In September 2002 Togomini was killed, but the MDJT continues to control large parts of the north of the country.

Further presidential and legislative elections took place in 2001 and 2002 respectively (both for 5-year terms). Amid many claims of fraud, Deby was re-elected and his party (the MPS) and its allies strengthened their position in parliament. In June 2005 an amendment was successfully passed by referendum to repeal the constitutional provision limiting the presidential mandate to 2 terms. Idriss Deby sucessfully stood for a third term as president in elections on 3 May 2006. The elections were boycotted by the main opposition parties. This election occurred in the midst of continued instability and violence in the east and south-east of the country, which is linked to instability in neighbouring Darfur (Sudan). In April 2006 rebels reached the capital N'Djamena, but were replused by loyalist forces. Instability has continued in the east of the country in 2007, including a significant conflagration in late November. An EU force of around 4,000 troops has now been agreed on by all parties and deployment is scheduled for early 2008. It will protect humanitarian workers, including those in the proposed UN mission, which should also deploy in early 2008.

Text Source: UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Country Profiles Section

Index of Total and Per Capita Food Production, Chad, 1961-1998

Index (1989=100)

Total — Per Capita

Net Cereal Imports and Food Aid as a Percent of Total Cereal Consumption, Chad, 1961-1998

☐ Imports and Food Aid ■ Domestic Production

4%

96%

Literacy Rate for Adults over the age of 15, Chad, 1980-2000

Percent

■ Women ■ Men

Charts Source: http://earthtrends.wri.org

Happy
Easter
2008
to all of
You

the
ITPCM STAFF

the itpcm & iccds base in Pisa, archive photo

itpcm

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